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This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environmental
constraints and limited resources. A unique final good is produced by combining inputs from two sectors.
One of these sectors uses "dirty" machines and thus creates environmental degradation. Research can
be directed to improving the technology of machines in either sector. We characterize dynamic tax
policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare, as a function of the degree
of substitutability between clean and dirty inputs, environmental and resource stocks, and cross-country
technological spillovers. We show that: (i) in the case where the inputs are sufficiently substitutable,
sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production;
(ii) optimal policy involves both "carbon taxes" and research subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon
taxes is avoided; (iii) delay in intervention is costly: the sooner and the stronger is the policy response,
the shorter is the slow growth transition phase; (iv) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input
production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two inputs are substitutes.
Under reasonable parameter values (corresponding to those used in existing models with exogenous
technology) and with sufficient substitutability between inputs, it is optimal to redirect technical change
towards clean technologies immediately and optimal environmental regulation need not reduce long-run
growth. We also show that in a two-country extension, even though optimal environmental policy
involves global policy coordination, when the two inputs are sufficiently substitutable environmental


























How to control and limit climate change caused by our growing consumption of fossil fuels and
to develop alternative energy sources to these fossil fuels are among the most pressing policy
challenges facing the world today. While climate scientists have focused on various aspects of
the damage that our current energy consumption causes to the environment,1 economists have
emphasized both the bene￿ts￿ in terms of limiting environmental degradation￿ and costs￿ in
terms of reducing economic growth￿ of di⁄erent policy proposals. More importantly, while a
large part of the discussion among climate scientists focuses on the e⁄ect of various policies
on the development of alternative￿ and more ￿environmentally friendly￿ ￿ energy sources, the
response of technological change to environmental policy has until very recently been all but
ignored by leading economic analyses of environment policy, which have mostly focused on
computable general equilibrium models with exogenous technology.2 This omission is despite
the fact that existing empirical evidence indicates that changes in the relative price of energy
inputs have an important e⁄ect on the types of technologies that are developed and adopted.
For example, Newell, Ja⁄e and Stavins (1999) show when energy prices were stable, innovations
in air-conditioning reduced the prices faced by consumers, but following the oil price hikes, air
conditioners became more energy e¢ cient. Popp (2002) provides more systematic evidence on
the same point by using patent data from 1970 to 1994; he documents the impact of energy
prices on patents for energy-saving innovations.
A satisfactory framework for the study of the costs and bene￿ts of di⁄erent environmental
policies must therefore include at its centerpiece the endogenous response of di⁄erent types of
technologies to proposed policies. Our purpose is to take a ￿rst step towards the development
of such a framework. We propose a simple two-sector model of directed technical change.
The unique ￿nal good is produced by combining the inputs produced by these two sectors.
One of them uses ￿dirty￿machines and creates environmental degradation. Pro￿t-maximizing
researchers build on previous innovations (￿build on the shoulders of giants￿ ) and direct their
research to improving the quality of machines in one or the other sector. We ￿rst focus on a
single (and closed) economy.
Our framework highlights the central roles played by the market size and the price e⁄ects
on the direction of technical change (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002). The market size e⁄ect encourages
innovation towards the larger input sector, while the price e⁄ect directs innovation towards
the sector with higher price. The relative magnitudes of these e⁄ects in our framework are, in
turn, determined by three factors: (1) the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors;3
1See, for instance, Stott et al. (2004) on the contribution of human activity to the European heatwave of
2003, Emanuel (2005) and Landsea (2005) on the increased impact and destructiveness of tropical cyclones and
Atlantic hurricanes over the last decades, and Nicholls and Lowe (2006) on sea-level rise.
2See, e.g., Nordhaus (1994), MacCracken et al. (1999), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
3The degree of substitution, which plays a central role in the model, has a clear empirical counterpart. For
1(2) the relative levels of development of the technologies of the two sectors; (3) whether dirty
inputs are produced using an exhaustible resource. Because of the environmental externality,
the decentralized equilibrium is not optimal. Moreover, the laissez-faire equilibrium typically
leads to an ￿environmental disaster,￿where the quality of the environment falls below a critical
threshold.
More interesting are the results concerning the types of policies that can prevent such
disasters, the structure of optimal environmental regulation and its long-run growth implica-
tions, and the costs of delay in implementing environmental regulation. Approaches based
on exogenous technology lead to three di⁄erent types of answers to (some of) these questions
depending on their assumptions. Simplifying existing approaches and assigning colorful labels,
we can summarize these as follows. The Nordhaus answer is that only limited and gradual
interventions are necessary. Optimal regulations should only reduce long-run growth by a
modest amount. The Stern/Al Gore answer is less optimistic. It calls for more extensive and
immediate interventions, and argues that these interventions need to be in place permanently
and will likely reduce long-run growth as the price for avoiding environmental disaster. The
more pessimistic Greenpeace answer is that essentially all growth needs to come to an end in
order to save the planet.
Against this background, our analysis suggests a very di⁄erent answer. In the empirically
plausible case where the two sectors (clean and dirty inputs) are highly substitutable (i.e., are
￿strong substitutes￿ ), immediate and decisive intervention is indeed necessary. Without in-
tervention, the economy would rapidly head towards an environmental disaster, in particular,
because the market size e⁄ect and the initial productivity advantage of dirty inputs would
direct innovation and production to that sector, contributing to environmental degradation.
However, optimal environmental regulation, or even simple suboptimal policies just using car-
bon taxes or pro￿t taxes/research subsidies, would be su¢ cient to redirect technical change
and avoid an environmental disaster. Moreover, these policies only need to be in place for a
temporary period, because once clean technologies are su¢ ciently advanced, research would be
directed towards these technologies without further government intervention. Consequently,
environmental goals can be achieved without permanent intervention and without sacri￿cing
(much or any) long-run growth. While this conclusion is even more optimistic than Nordhaus
answer, as in the Stern/Al Gore or Greenpeace perspectives delay costs are signi￿cant, not
simply because of the direct environmental damage, but because delay increases the gap be-
example, renewable energy, provided it can be stored and transported e¢ ciently, would be highly substitutable
with energy derived from fossil fuels. This reasoning would suggest a (very) high degree of substitution between
dirty and clean inputs, since the same production services can be obtained from alternative energy with less
pollution. In contrast, if the ￿clean alternative￿ were to reduce our consumption of energy permanently, for
example by using less e⁄ective transport technologies, this would correspond to a low degree of substitution,
since greater consumption of non-energy commodities would increase the demand for energy. Moreover, this
parameter, though not systematically investigated by existing research, can be estimated in future empirical
work and should become a crucial input into the design of environmental policy.
2tween clean and dirty sectors, thus calling for higher taxes (and for a more extended period of
economic slowdown) in the future.
Notably, our model also nests the Stern/Al Gore and Greenpeace answers. When the two
sectors are substitutable, but not su¢ ciently so, preventing an environmental disaster requires
a permanent policy intervention (even though, in this case, an environmental disaster develops
less rapidly). When the two sectors are complementary, then the only way to stave o⁄ a
disaster is to stop long-run growth.
A simple but important implication of our analysis is that optimal environmental regulation
should always use both an input tax (￿carbon tax￿ ) to control current emissions and research
subsidies or pro￿t taxes to in￿ uence the direction of research. Even though a carbon tax would
by itself discourage research in the dirty sector, using this tax both to reduce current emissions
and to in￿ uence the path of research would lead to excessive distortions. Instead, optimal
policy relies less on a carbon tax and more on direct encouragement to the development of
clean technologies.
As a ￿rst step towards a quantitative analysis of environmental policy in the presence of
endogenous and directed technical change, we also perform a simple calibration exercise. We
relate our environmental quality variable to temperature and atmospheric concentration of
carbon. We ￿nd that, in the presence of directed technical change, for high (but reasonable)
elasticities of substitution between clean and dirty inputs (nonfossil and fossil fuels), the opti-
mal policy involves an immediate switch of all R&D e⁄ort to clean technologies, even though
in our baseline case it takes about seven decades for 90% of production to switch to clean tech-
nologies. The general quantitative structure of optimal environmental policy appears broadly
robust to whether one uses a low or medium discount rate (which is the main source of the
di⁄erent conclusions on optimal environmental policy in the Stern report or in Nordhaus￿ s
research), when the clean and dirty inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable.
Our framework also illustrates the e⁄ects of exhaustibility of resources on the laissez-faire
equilibrium and on the structure of optimal policy. An environmental disaster is less likely
when the dirty sector uses an exhaustible resource (and the two sectors have a high degree
of substitution), because the increase in the price of the resource as it is depleted reduces its
use, and this encourages research to be redirected towards clean technologies. Therefore, an
environmental disaster could be avoided without government intervention. Nevertheless, the
structure of optimal environmental regulation looks broadly similar to the case without an
exhaustible resource and again relies both on carbon taxes and research subsidies.
Finally, we brie￿ y discuss whether in a multi-country world an environmental disaster can
be avoided by policies in the ￿North￿alone, that is, without global policy coordination imposing
similar environmental regulations in the South (i.e., in developing countries such as India
and China). Our framework suggests that when there are international technology linkages
3and no international trade, and when the two sectors are highly substitutable, environmental
regulation only in the North may be su¢ cient to stave o⁄ an environmental disaster, because
once these policies induce a su¢ cient improvement in the technology of the clean sector, the
South will also adjust its production and technology choices. However, free international trade,
without global policy coordination, may lead to increased environmental damage by creating
a ￿pollution haven￿in the South and thus increase the need for global policy coordination.
Our paper relates to the literature on growth, resources, and the environment. Nord-
haus￿(1994) pioneering study proposed a dynamic integrated model of climate change and
the economy (the DICE model), which extends the neoclassical Ramsey model with equations
representing emissions and climate change, and their interactions with economic outcomes.4
In our calibration exercise we build on Nordhaus￿study and results. Another branch of the
literature focuses on the measurement of the costs of climate change, particularly stressing
issues related to risk, uncertainty and discounting.5 Based on the assessment of discounting
and related issues, this literature has prescribed either decisive and immediate governmental
action (for example, Stern, 2006) or a more gradualist approach, with modest control in the
short-run followed by sharper emissions reduction in the medium and the long run.6 Recent
work by Golosov, Hassler, Krusell and Tsyvinski (2009) characterizes the structure of optimal
policies in a model with exogenous technology and exhaustible resources, where oil suppliers
set prices to maximize discounted pro￿ts. They show that the optimal resource tax should be
decreasing over time. Finally, some authors have built on Weitzman￿ s (1974) analysis on the
use of price or quantity instruments to study climate change policy and the choice between
taxes and quotas.7
The response of technology to environmental degradation and environmental policy, our
main focus in this paper, has received much less attention in the economics literature, however.
Early work by Stokey (1998) highlighted the tension between growth and the environment,
and showed that degradation of the environment can create an endogenous limit to growth.
Recent research by Jones (2009) provides a systematic analysis of conditions under which en-
vironmental and other costs of growth will outweigh its bene￿ts. Aghion and Howitt (1998,
Chapter 5) introduced environmental constraints in a Schumpeterian growth model and em-
4Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) extend the DICE model to include eight regions making decisions independently
(the ￿RICE￿ model, or Regional Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy). The analysis of
economic activity and its consequences in terms of climate change using this type of approach has been the
subject of an extensive report conducted by Stern (2006).
5For example, Stern (2006), Weitzman (2007, 2008), Dasgupta (2007, 2008), Nordhaus (2007), von Below
and Persson (2008), Mendelsohn (2007), and Tol and Yohe (2006).
6See, for example, the work by Nordhaus and coauthors (1994, 2000, 2002). A survey of the results of
greenhouse-gas stabilization policy in several climate-change models can be found in Energy Modeling Forum
Study 19 (2004).
7See for example Hepburn (2006) and Pizer (2002). In addition, several studies address the importance
of internationally coordinated policy, such as Stern (2006) and Watson (2001). Aldy et al. (2003) provide a
comparison of the di⁄erent architectures for global climate policy.
4phasized that environmental constraints may not prevent sustainable long-run growth when
environment-saving innovations are allowed. Neither of these early contributions allowed tech-
nological change to be directed to clean or dirty technologies.
Subsequent work by Popp (2004) allowed for directed innovation in the energy sector.8
Popp presents a calibration exercise and establishes that models that ignore the directed tech-
nical change e⁄ects can signi￿cantly overstate the cost of environmental regulation. While
Popp￿ s work is highly complementary to ours, neither his work nor others develop a system-
atic framework for the analysis of the impact of environmental regulations on the direction of
technological change. We develop a general and tractable framework, extending the models in
Acemoglu (1998, 2002), that allows us:9 (i) to perform systematic comparative analyses for the
e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of policies on innovation, growth and environmental resources both
with and without directed technical change; (ii) to study the implications of dirty inputs using
exhaustible resources; (iii) to characterize dynamic optimal policy; and (iv) to study the role
of international linkages in technology and trade on the e⁄ects of environmental regulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our basic frame-
work without exhaustible resources and presents the majority of our main results. In particular,
it characterizes the laissez-faire equilibrium and shows how this can lead to an environmental
disaster. It then shows how simple policy interventions can prevent environmental disasters
and clari￿es the role of directed technical change in these results. Section 3 characterizes
the structure of optimal environmental policy in this setup. Section 4 provides a preliminary
quantitative assessment of how directed technical change a⁄ects the structure of optimal policy
under reasonable parameter values. Section 5 studies the economy with exhaustible resources.
Section 6 discusses global policy coordination. Section 7 concludes. The main appendices con-
tain the proofs of some of the key results stated in the text, and the Supplementary Appendix
contains the remaining proofs and additional quantitative exercises.
8Nordhaus (2002) also extends the R&DICE model by including a simple form of induced technical change.
In particular, he uses a variant of his previous framework with ￿xed proportions, in which R&D is modeled as
shifting the minimum level of carbon/energy inputs required for production. However, since factor substitution
is not allowed in the model, it is not possible to compare the role of induced innovation with that of factor
substitution in reducing greenhouse emissions. Popp￿ s (2004) ENTICE model allows for both endogenous
technological change and factor substitution.
9First attempts at introducing endogenous directed technical change in models of growth and the environment
also build on Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and include Grubler and Messner (1998), Manne and Richels (2002),
Messner (1997), Buonanno et al (2003), Nordhaus (2002), Sue Wing (2003), and Di Maria and Valente (2006).
Grimaud and Rouge (2008) and Aghion and Howitt (2009, Chapter 16) are more closely related to the approach
followed in this paper.
More recently, Gans (2009) develops a two-period model based on Acemoglu (2009b) to discuss the Porter
hypothesis, that environmental regulation can lead to faster technological progress (see also Rauscher, 2009).
In particular he shows that this would require a high degree of substitutability between clean and dirty inputs.
We abstract from this channel in the current paper by assuming that the total R&D resources in the economy
are constant, focusing instead on long-run growth sustainability and the characterization of dynamic optimal
policies.
52 Baseline Model: Non-Exhaustible Resource
In this section, we introduce the baseline framework (without an exhaustible resource). We
identify the market size and price e⁄ects on the direction of technical change and characterize
the equilibrium of the economy under laissez-faire. We then discuss how policy interventions
may be necessary to avoid ￿environmental disasters￿ , and the costs of delayed intervention.
2.1 Preferences, Production and the Environment
We consider an in￿nite-horizon discrete-time economy inhabited by a continuum of house-
holds comprising workers, entrepreneurs and scientists. We assume that all households have






where Ct is consumption of the unique ￿nal good at time t, St denotes the quality of the
environment at time t, and ￿ > 0 is the discount rate.10 We assume that St 2 [0;S], where S
is the quality of the environment absent any human pollution, and to simplify the notation,
we also assume that this is also the initial level of quality, that is, S0 = S.
The instantaneous utility function u(C;S) is increasing both in C and S, twice di⁄eren-









= 1, and lim
S#0
u(C;S) = ￿1: (2)
The last two conditions imply that the quality of the environment reaching its lower bound












which implies that as S approaches S, the value of the marginal increase in environmental
quality is small. This assumption is adopted to simplify the characterization of optimal envi-
ronmental policy in Section 3, and we discuss below how relaxing it a⁄ects the results.
There is a unique ￿nal good, produced competitively using ￿clean￿and ￿dirty￿inputs Yc













10For now, S can be thought of as a measure of general environmental quality. In our quantitative exercise
in Section 4, we will explicitly relate S to the increase in temperature since pre-industrial times and to carbon
concentration in the atmosphere.
11Alternatively, the negative consequences of environmental degradation could have been incorporated into
the production structure with equivalent results.
6where " 2 (0;+1) is the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors. Throughout, we
say that the two sectors are (gross) substitutes when " > 1 and (gross) complements when " < 1
(throughout we ignore the ￿Cobb-Douglas￿case of " = 1).12 The case of substitutes " > 1 (in
fact, an elasticity of substitution signi￿cantly greater than 1) appears as the more empirically
relevant benchmark, since we would expect successful clean technologies to substitute for the
functions of dirty technologies. Nevertheless, since the relevant elasticity of substitution has
not yet been carefully estimated, and because the case of complements both highlights a variety
of di⁄erent and novel economic forces and is theoretically interesting, throughout we discuss
both cases, though we place more emphasis on the case of substitutes.
Both Yct and Ydt are produced using labor and a continuum of sector-speci￿c machines














where ￿ 2 (0;1), Ajit is the quality of machine of type i used in sector j 2 fc;dg at time t
and xjit is the quantity of this machine. This setup is similar to Acemoglu (1998), except that
employment in the two sectors is endogenously determined and the distribution parameters





as the aggregate productivity in sector j 2 fc;dg. This speci￿cation implies that Ad corre-
sponds to ￿dirty technologies,￿while Ac represents ￿clean technologies￿ . None of our results
depend on a complete separation between dirty and clean technologies. In fact, the production


























so that changes in Ac and Ad correspond to the fraction of ￿tasks￿performed using clean vs.
dirty technologies.
Market clearing for labor requires labor demand to be less than total labor supply, which
is normalized to 1, i.e.,
Lct + Ldt ￿ 1: (7)
12As mentioned in the Introduction, renewable energy that can be stored and transported e¢ ciently would
correspond to a high degree of substitution between dirty and clean inputs, since the same production services
can be obtained from alternative energy with less pollution. Similarly, cars using gasoline versus cars using
clean energy sources would be examples of highly substitutable dirty and clean inputs. In contrast, if ￿clean
alternatives￿involved reductions in our consumption of energy or transportation services, this would correspond
to a low degree of substitution. Similarly, if ￿green cars￿were produced using components that require other
dirty inputs, the relevant elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty sectors would be smaller.
7In line with the literature on endogenous technical change, machines (for both sectors) are
supplied by monopolistically competitive ￿rms. Regardless of the quality of machines and of
the sector for which they are designed, producing one unit of any machine costs   units of the
￿nal good. Without loss of generality, we normalize   ￿ ￿2.
The innovation possibilities frontier is as follows. At the beginning of every period, each
scientist decides whether to direct her research to clean or dirty technology. She is then
randomly allocated to at most one machine (without any congestion; so that each machine
is also allocated to at most one scientist) and is successful in innovation with probability
￿j 2 (0;1) in sector j 2 fc;dg, where innovation increases the quality of a machine by a factor
1+￿ (with ￿ > 0), that is, from Ajit to (1+￿)Ajit).13 A successful scientist (who has invented
a better version of machine i in sector j 2 fc;dg) obtains a one-period patent and becomes the
entrepreneur for the current period in the production of machine i. In sectors where innovation
is not successful, monopoly rights are allocated randomly to an entrepreneur drawn from the
pool of potential entrepreneurs who then uses the old technology.14 Our innovation possibilities
frontier where scientists can only target a sector (rather than a speci￿c machine) ensures that
scientists are allocated across the di⁄erent machines in a sector.15 We also normalize the
measure of scientists s to 1 and denote the mass of scientists working on machines in sector
j 2 fc;dg at time t by sjt. Hence market clearing for scientists takes the form
sct + sdt ￿ 1: (8)
Finally, the quality of the environment, St, evolves according to the di⁄erence equation.
St+1 = ￿￿Ydt + (1 + ￿)St; (9)
whenever the right hand side of (9) is in the interval (0;S). Whenever the right hand side is
negative, St+1 = 0, and whenever the right hand side is greater than S, St+1 = S.16
13Our model therefore imposes that all technical change takes a ￿factor-augmenting￿ form, increasing Act
or Adt (see Acemoglu, 2009). In practice, non-factor-augmenting improvements are also possible, though more
di¢ cult to incorporate into a growth model. Acemoglu (2007) provides a comprehensive analysis of the e⁄ects of
changes in factor supplies on the endogenous bias of technology without restricting productivity improvements
to take a factor-augmenting form (and thus allowing endogenous changes in the elasticity of substitution, ").
14The assumptions here are adopted to simplify the exposition and mimic the structure of equilibrium in
continuous time models as in Acemoglu (2002) (see also Aghion and Howitt, 2009, for this approach). We
adopt a discrete time setup throughout to simplify the analysis of dynamics. The Supplementary Appendix
shows that the qualitative results are identical in an alternative formulation with patents and free entry (instead
of monopoly rights being allocated to entrepreneurs).
15As highlighted further by equation (15) below, this structure implies that innovation builds on the existing
level of quality of a machine, and thus incorporates the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿feature. In terms of
the framework in Acemoglu (2002), this implies that there is ￿state dependence￿in the innovation possibilities
frontier, in the sense that advances in one sector make future advances in that sector more pro￿table or more
e⁄ective. This is a natural feature in the current context, since improvements in fossil fuel technology should
not (and in practice do not) directly translate into innovations in alternative and renewable energy sources.
Nevertheless, one could allow some spillovers between the two sectors, that is, ￿limited state dependence￿as in
Acemoglu (2002).
16Or equivalently, St+1 = max
￿
minh￿￿Ydt + (1 + ￿)St;i0;S
￿
.
8The parameter ￿ measures the rate of environmental degradation resulting from the pro-
duction of dirty inputs,17 and ￿ is the rate of ￿environmental regeneration￿ . Recall that S
is the maximum level of environmental quality corresponding to zero pollution. This equa-
tion introduces the major externality in our model, from the production of the dirty input to
environmental degradation. Note that if St = 0, then S￿ will remain at 0 for all ￿ > t.
While other papers in the environment literature typically use more detailed descriptions
of environmental dynamics, in this paper we take a ￿reduced-form￿approach and concentrate
instead on identifying the new economic forces that arise in the presence of directed technical
change. Nevertheless, equation (9) captures several important features of environmental change
in practice. First, we assume an exponential regeneration rate ￿ because greater environmental
degradation is typically presumed to lower the regeneration capacity of the globe. For example,
part of the carbon in the atmosphere is absorbed by the ice cap; as the ice cap melts because
of global warming, more carbon is released into the atmosphere and the melting of the ice
cap decreases the albedo of the planet further contributing to global warming. Similarly,
the depletion of forests reduces carbon absorption, contributing further to global warming.
Second, as already mentioned above, the upper bound S captures the idea that environmental
degradation results from pollution, and that pollution cannot be negative. We discuss below
how our results change under alternative laws of motion for the quality of the environment.
2.2 The laissez-faire equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium outcome, that is, the decen-
tralized equilibrium without any policy intervention. We ￿rst characterize the equilibrium
production and labor decisions for given productivity parameters. We then analyze the direc-
tion of technical change.
An equilibrium is given by sequences of wages (wt), prices for inputs (pjt), prices for ma-
chines (pjit), demands for machines (xjit), demands for inputs (Yjt), labor demands (Ljt) by
input producers j 2 fc;dg, research allocations (sdt;sct), and quality of environment (St) such
that, in each period t: (i) (pjit;xjit) maximizes pro￿ts by the producer of machine i in sector j;
(ii) Ljt maximizes pro￿ts by producers of input j; (iii) Yjt maximizes the pro￿ts of ￿nal good
producers; (iv) (sdt;sct) maximizes the expected pro￿t of a researcher at date t; (v) the wage
wt and the prices pjt clear the labor and input markets respectively; and (vi) the evolution of
St is given by (9).
17Equation (9) can be equivalently written as
St+1 = ￿(￿Ydt=Yt)Yt + (1 + ￿)St;
where ￿Ydt=Yt represents the rate of emissions per unit of ￿nal good production. This alternative form highlights
both that clean technologies enable a reduction in emissions per unit of ￿nal good and that technological changes
reducing ￿ would have similar results to those increasing Ac.
9To simplify the notation, we de￿ne ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") and impose the following assump-

























This assumption imposes the reasonable condition that initially the clean sector is su¢ -
ciently backward relative to the dirty (fossil fuel) sector, so that under laissez-faire and with
" > 1, the economy starts innovating in the dirty sector. This assumption enables us to focus
on the more relevant part of the parameter space (see Appendix A for the case in which this
assumption does not hold).
We ￿rst consider the equilibrium at time t for given technology levels Acit and Adit. For
this particular part we drop the subscript t. As the ￿nal good is produced competitively the










This equation implies that the relative price of clean inputs (compared to dirty inputs) is de-
creasing in their relative supply, and moreover, that the elasticity of the relative price response
is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. Our normalization of
































Thus the demand for machine i in sector j increases with the price pj of input j and with
employment Lj in that sector, since both increase the pro￿tability of all machines used in that
sector, encouraging producers to use more of each. It is also increasing in the quality of such
machines, Aji, and decreasing in their price, pji.
The monopolist producer of machine i in sector j chooses pji and xji to maximize pro￿ts
￿ji = (pji ￿  )xji, subject to the inverse demand curve (11). Given this iso-elastic demand, the
pro￿t-maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal cost, thus pji =  =￿. Recalling
10the normalization   ￿ ￿2, this implies that pji = ￿ and thus the equilibrium demand for





Equilibrium pro￿ts for the monopolist are then given by





















This equation formalizes the natural idea that the input produced with more productive ma-
chines will be relatively cheaper.
We next endogeneize productivity by linking productivity growth to R&D in clean and dirty
technologies (for clarity, we now reintroduce the time subscript t). If a scientist succeeds in
innovation, she discovers a new machine that is (1 + ￿) times more productive than its previous
vintage, Ajit￿1. Therefore, denoting the mass of scientists directing their e⁄ort to sector j by
sjt; and recalling that scientists targeting sector j are randomly allocated across machines in







To determine the evolution of average productivities in the two sectors, we need to char-
acterize the pro￿tability of research in these sectors, which will determine the direction of
technical change. Taking into account the probability of success, the expected pro￿t ￿jt for a







jt Ljt (1 + ￿)Ajit￿1di




where the second line simply uses (6). Consequently, the relative bene￿t from undertaking




















Adt￿1 | {z }
direct productivity e⁄ect
: (17)
When this ratio is higher, R&D directed towards the clean technologies becomes more prof-
itable. This equation shows that incentives to innovate in the clean versus the dirty sector
11machines are shaped by three forces: (i) the direct productivity e⁄ect (captured by the term
Act=Adt), which pushes towards innovating in the sector with higher productivity; this force
results from the presence of the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿e⁄ect highlighted in (15);
(ii) the price e⁄ect (captured by the term (pct=pdt)
1
1￿￿), encouraging innovation towards the
sector with higher prices, which from (14) is the relatively backward sector; (iii) the market
size e⁄ect (captured by the term Lct=Ldt), encouraging innovation in the sector with greater
employment, which has the larger market for machines. Which sector has greater employment
and a larger market is in turn determined by relative productivities and the elasticity of substi-
tution between the two inputs. The more substitutable the two inputs are, the more important
is the market size e⁄ect compared to the price e⁄ect. We next explore this issue.




Combining (18) with (10), then using (14) and the de￿nition of ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ "), we obtain

















Thus the market size e⁄ect creates a force towards innovation in the more backward sector
when " < 1, and in the more advanced sector when " > 1. More speci￿cally, combining (14),














which yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In the laissez-faire equilibrium, innovation at time t occurs in the clean sector only
when ￿cA
￿’
ct￿1 > ￿d (1 + ￿￿c)
’+1 A
￿’






dt￿1, and in both sectors when ￿c (1 + ￿￿dsdt)
’+1 A
￿’




sct + sdt = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A, where we also present a complete characterization of the equilib-
rium allocations of scientists and equilibrium innovation.
The noteworthy conclusion of this lemma is that innovation will favor the more advanced
sector when " > 1. In particular, in this case ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") < 0, and thus the direct
productivity and market size e⁄ects are stronger than the price e⁄ect. In contrast, when
" < 1, innovation will favor the less advanced sector because ’ > 0 and therefore the direct
productivity e⁄ect is weaker than the price e⁄ect and the market size e⁄ect, which now reinforce
each other.
12Finally, output of the two inputs and the ￿nal good in the laissez-faire equilibrium can be





























Using these expressions and Lemma 1, we establish:
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique laissez-faire equilib-
rium, which takes the following form:
￿ If " > 1, innovation always occurs in the dirty sector only, and the long-run growth rate
of dirty input production is ￿￿d.
￿ If " < 1 innovation ￿rst occurs in the clean sector, then occurs in both sectors and asymp-
totically the share of scientists devoted to the clean sector is given by sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d);
the long-run growth rate of dirty input production in this case is ￿e ￿, where e ￿ ￿ ￿c￿d=(￿c + ￿d).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for this proposition follows from Lemma 1. When the two inputs are substi-
tutes (" > 1), innovation starts in the dirty sector, which is more advanced initially (Assump-
tion 1). This increases the gap between the dirty and the clean sectors and the initial pattern
of equilibrium is reinforced. In this case, only Ad grows (at the rate ￿￿d) and Ac remains
constant; moreover, since ’ is negative in this case, in the long run Yd also grows at the rate
￿￿d. In contrast, in the empirically less relevant case where the two inputs are complements
(" < 1), the price e⁄ect dominates and innovation initially takes place in the more backward￿
in this case, the clean￿ sector. This reduces the technology gap between the two sectors and
ultimately the equilibrium must involve innovation in both sectors; in particular, the share
of scientists allocated to the clean sector converges towards sc = ￿c=(￿c + ￿d), which ensures
that both sectors grow at the same rate (see Appendix B). In particular, in this case average
quality levels in both sectors, Ac and Ad, grow at the same asymptotic rate ￿e ￿, and thus so
does Yd.
2.3 Directed technical change and environmental disasters
A major concern by climate scientists is that the environment may deteriorate so much that it
reaches a ￿point of no return￿ . In our environment equation (9), this notion is captured by the
fact that if environmental quality St reaches 0 in ￿nite time, it remains at 0 forever thereafter.
Motivated by this feature, we de￿ne the notion of an environmental disaster, which will be
useful for developing the main intuitions implied by our framework, before we provide a more
complete characterization of optimal environmental policy.
13De￿nition 1 An environmental disaster occurs if St = 0 for some t < 1.
Our assumptions on the utility function, in particular, that u(C;0) = ￿1, imply that an
environmental disaster cannot be part of a welfare-maximizing allocation (for any ￿ < 1). In
this subsection, we show that a simple policy of ￿redirecting technical change￿can avoid an
environmental disaster (which would otherwise occur in the laissez-faire equilibrium). We will
then highlight the role of directed technical change by comparing the results to a model in
which scientists cannot direct their research to di⁄erent sectors.
We ￿rst note that the economy under laissez-faire will necessarily end up in a disaster. This
follows both from the fact (Proposition 1) that dirty input production Yd always grows without
bound, and that a level of production of dirty input greater than (1 + ￿)￿￿1S necessarily leads
to a disaster next period. We thus have (proof omitted):
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the laissez-faire equilibrium always leads
to an environmental disaster.
Remark 1 Equation (21) implies that the long-run growth rate of dirty input production in
the substitutable case, ￿￿d, is greater than its long-run growth rate in the complementarity
case, ￿e ￿, since in the latter case R&D resources are spread across the two sectors. Then for
given initial technological levels Ac0 and Ad0; the production of dirty input is always higher
in the substitutability case than in the complementarity case. This implies that the disaster
occurs sooner in the substitutability case than in the complementarity case (see Supplementary
Appendix for a proof).
Remark 2 Our analysis can be extended to di⁄erent laws of motion of the environmental
stock, with similar results. For example, we could dispense with the upper bound on environ-
mental quality, so that S = 1. In this case, the results are similar, except that a disaster
can be avoided even if dirty input production grows at a positive rate, provided that this
rate is lower than the regeneration rate of the environment, ￿. An alternative is to suppose
St+1 = ￿￿Ydt+St+￿, so that the regeneration of the environment is additive rather than pro-
portional to current quality. With this alternative law of motion, it is straightforward to show
that the results are essentially identical to the baseline formulation because a disaster can only
be avoided if Ydt does not grow at a positive exponential rate in the long run. Consequently,
in this case, Proposition 2 continues to apply. Finally, one could assume that environmental
degradation is caused by dirty machines, the xjit￿ s, rather than by dirty input production, Ydt.
Given our other assumptions, the results in this case are also similar to those in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 implies that some type of intervention is necessary to avoid a disaster. For a
preliminary investigation of the implications of such intervention, suppose that the government
14can subsidize scientists to work in the clean sector, for example, using a proportional pro￿t
subsidy (￿nanced through a lump-sum tax on the representative household).18 Denoting this
subsidy rate by qt, the expected pro￿t from undertaking research in the clean sector becomes




while ￿dt is still given by (16). This immediately implies that a su¢ ciently high subsidy to
clean research can redirect innovation towards the clean sector.19 Moreover, while this subsidy
is implemented, the ratio Act=Adt will grow at the rate ￿￿c. The implications of the tax then
depend on the degree of substitutability between the two inputs. When the two inputs are
substitutes (" > 1), a temporary subsidy (maintained for the necessary number of periods, D)
is su¢ cient to redirect all research to the clean sector. More speci￿cally, while the subsidy is
being implemented, the ratio Ac=Ad will increase, and when it has become su¢ ciently high,
it will be pro￿table for scientists to direct their research to the clean sector even without the
subsidy.20 Then (21) implies that Yd will grow asymptotically at the same rate as A
￿+’
c .
If " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿) so that the two inputs are strong substitutes, then ￿ + ’ ￿ 0 and Yd
will not grow in the long-run. In this case, provided that the initial environmental quality is
su¢ ciently high, a temporary subsidy is su¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster. This case
thus gives the most optimistic implications of our analysis, where a temporary intervention is
su¢ cient to redirect technical change, and avoid an environmental disaster without preventing
long-run growth or even creating long-run distortions. This contrasts with the Nordhaus, the
Stern/Al Gore, and the Greenpeace answers discussed in the Introduction.
If, instead, " 2 (1;1=(1 ￿ ￿)) (or ￿+’ > 0) so that we have weak but not strong substitutes,
then temporary intervention is su¢ cient to redirect all research to the clean sector, but equation
(21) implies that even after this happens, Yd will grow at rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿+’￿1 > 0. Intuitively,
since " > 1, as the average quality of clean machines increases, workers get reallocated towards
the clean sector (because of the market size e⁄ect). At the same time the increase of the
relative price of the dirty input over time encourages production of the dirty input (the price
e⁄ect). As shown in the previous paragraph, in the strong substitutes case the ￿rst e⁄ect
dominates. In contrast, in the weak substitutes case, where " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿), the second e⁄ect
18The results are identical if we focus on pro￿ts taxes on the dirty sector or on other types of research subsidies.
19In particular, following the analysis in Appendix A, to implement a unique equilibrium where all scientists
direct their research to the clean sector, the subsidy rate qt must satisfy







￿ 1 if " ￿
2 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿











20The temporary tax needs to be imposed for D periods where D is the smallest integer such that:
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15dominates,21 and Yd increases even though Ad is constant. In this case, we thus obtain the
less optimistic conclusion that a temporary subsidy redirecting research to the clean sector
will not be su¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster; instead, similar to the Stern/Al Gore
position, permanent government regulation is necessary to avoid environmental disaster.
Finally, when the two inputs are complements (" < 1), our model delivers the most pes-
simistic conclusion. With or without a temporary subsidy to clean research, the more backward
sector always catches up with the more advanced sector.22 Thus in the long run, innovation
will take place in both sectors, and production of the dirty input will continue to grow asymp-
totically. Therefore, an environmental disaster becomes unavoidable, unless long-run growth is
halted entirely as in the Greenpeace position. Nevertheless, as noted above, we would plausibly
expect a relatively high degree of substitution between clean and dirty inputs, so our analysis
also highlights why the Greenpeace position rests on empirically less plausible assumptions.
This discussion establishes the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 3 When the two inputs are strong substitutes (" ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and S is su¢ -
ciently high, a temporary subsidy to clean research will prevent an environmental disaster. In
contrast, when the two inputs are complements or weak substitute (" < 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), a temporary
subsidy to clean research cannot prevent an environmental disaster.
Thus, when the two inputs are strong substitutes, redirecting technical change using a tem-
porary policy intervention can be su¢ cient to avoid a disaster. This shows the importance of
directed technical change: temporary incentives are su¢ cient to induce research to be directed
to clean technologies, and once clean technologies are su¢ ciently advanced, innovation and
production will shift su¢ ciently towards those technologies so that environmental disaster can
be avoided without further intervention.
Remark 3 It is useful to note that all of the main results in this section are a consequence of
endogenous and directed technical change. We can envisage an environment without directed
technical change by considering the same model with scientists randomly allocated across sec-
tors. Suppose, for simplicity, that this is done so as to ensure equal growth in the qualities of
clean and dirty machines (at the rate ￿e ￿). Recall that when the two inputs are strong substi-
tutes (" ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), dirty input production grows at the higher rate ￿￿d. Thus, when the
two inputs are strong substitutes, under laissez-faire a disaster will occur sooner with directed
21A di⁄erent intuition for the case in which " 2 (1;1=(1 ￿ ￿)) is that improvements in the technology of the
clean sector also correspond to improvements in the technology of the ￿nal good, which uses them as inputs;
the ￿nal good, in turn, is an input for the dirty sector because machines employed in this sector are produced
using the ￿nal good; hence, technical change in the clean sector creates a force towards the expansion of the
dirty sector.
22The proof of this claim follows closely the proof of Proposition 1. In particular, regardless of which sector
innovation is ￿rst directed at, innovation in the long run must take place in both sectors, which in turn implies
that the long-run growth rate must be ￿e ￿:
16technical change than without. But also while with directed technical change a temporary
subsidy can redirect innovation towards the clean sector, preventing an environmental dis-
aster, without directed technical change such redirecting is not possible and thus temporary
interventions cannot prevent an environmental disaster.
2.4 Costs of delay
Policy intervention is costly in our framework because during the period of adjustment (while
productivity in the clean sector is catching up with that in the dirty sector), ￿nal output
increases more slowly than had innovation been directed towards the dirty sector (in the
absence of intervention). We will study the welfare costs of intervention in Section 3. Before
doing this, it is instructive to look at a simple measure of the (short-run) cost of intervention,
de￿ned as the number of periods T necessary for the economy under the policy intervention
to reach the same level of output as it would have done within one period in the absence of
the intervention: in other words, this is the length of the transition period or the number of
periods of ￿slow growth￿in output growth. We focus here on the substitutability case " > 1.











































It can be veri￿ed that starting at any t ￿ 1, we have T ￿ 2 (in the equilibrium in Proposition
3 and with " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)). Thus once innovation is directed towards the clean sector it will
take more than one period for the economy to achieve the same output growth as it would have
achieved in just one period in the laissez-faire equilibrium of Proposition 1 (with innovation still
directed at the dirty sector). The following corollary then follows immediately from equation
(22), in particular, recalling that ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") (proof omitted):
Corollary 1 For Adt￿1=Act￿1 ￿ 1, the short-run cost of intervention, T, is nondecreasing
in the technology gap Adt￿1=Act￿1 and the elasticity of substitution ". Moreover, T increases
more with Adt￿1=Act￿1 when " is greater.
The (short-run) cost of intervention, T, is increasing in Adt￿1=Act￿1 because a larger gap
between the initial quality of dirty and clean machines leads to a longer transition phase,
and thus to a longer period of low growth. In addition, T is also increasing in the elasticity of
substitution ". Intuitively, if the two inputs are close substitutes, ￿nal output production relies
17mostly on the more productive input, and therefore, productivity improvement in the clean
sector (taking place during the transition phase) will have less impact on overall productivity
until the clean technologies surpass the dirty ones.
The corollary shows that delaying intervention is costly, not only because of the continued
environmental degradation that will result, but also because during the period of delay Adt=Act
will increase further, and thus when the intervention is eventually implemented, the temporary
subsidy to clean research will need to be imposed for longer and there will be a longer period of
slow growth (higher T). This result is clearly related to the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿
feature of the innovation process. Furthermore, the result that the e⁄ects of " and Adt￿1=Act￿1
on T are complementary implies that delaying the starting date of the intervention is more
costly when the two inputs are more substitutable. These results imply that even though for
the strong substitutes case the implications of our model are more optimistic than those of
Nordhaus, in contrast to the implications of his analysis, gradual and delayed intervention
would have signi￿cant costs.
Overall, the analysis in this subsection has established that a simple policy intervention
that ￿redirects￿technical change towards environment friendly technologies can help prevent
an environmental disaster. Our analysis also highlights that delaying intervention may be quite
costly, not only because it further damages the environment (an e⁄ect already recognized in
the climate science literature), but also because it widens the gap between the dirty and clean
technologies, thereby inducing a longer period of catch-up with slower growth.
3 Optimal environmental policy
We have so far studied the behavior of the laissez-faire equilibrium and discussed how environ-
mental disaster may be avoided. In this subsection, we characterize the optimal allocation of
resources in this economy and discuss how it can be decentralized by using ￿carbon￿taxes and
research subsidies. The socially-planned (optimal) allocation will ￿correct￿for two externali-
ties: (1) the environmental externality exerted by dirty input producers, and (2) the knowledge
externalities from R&D (the fact that in the laissez-faire equilibrium scientists do not internal-
ize the e⁄ects of their research on productivity in the future). In addition, the planner can and
will correct for the standard static monopoly distortion in the price of machines, encouraging
more intensive use of existing machines (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt, 1998, or Ace-
moglu, 2009). Throughout this section, we assume that the social planner (government) has
access to lump-sum taxes and transfers to complement the other policy instruments (and thus
raise or redistribute revenues as required). A key conclusion of the analysis in this section is
that optimal policy must use both a ￿carbon￿tax (i.e., a tax on dirty input production) and
a subsidy to clean research, the former to control carbon emissions and the latter to in￿ uence
the path of future research. Relying only on carbon taxes would be excessively distortionary.
183.1 The social planner￿ s problem
The social planner￿ s problem is one of choosing a dynamic path of ￿nal good production
Yt, consumption Ct, input productions Yjt, expected machines production xjit, labor share
allocation Ljt, scientists allocation sjt, environmental quality St; and quality of machines Ajit;
that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the representative consumer, (1), subject to (4),
(5), (7), (8), (9), (15), and









Let ￿t denote the Lagrange multiplier for (4), which is naturally also the shadow value of
one unit of ￿nal good production. The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to Yt imply that this
shadow value is also equal to the Lagrange multiplier for (23), so that it is also equal to the









so that, again naturally, the shadow value of the ￿nal good is equal to the marginal utility of
consumption.
The ratio ￿jt=￿t can then be interpreted as the shadow price of input j at time t (relative
to the price of the ￿nal good). To emphasize this interpretation, we will denote this ratio by









so that for given price, average technology and labor allocation, the production of each input
is scaled up by a factor ￿
￿￿
1￿￿ compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium (this results from the
more intensive use of machines in the socially-planned allocation).
Next, letting !t denote the Lagrange multiplier for the environmental equation (9), the







+ (1 + ￿)ISt<S!t+1; (26)
















which can be compared to the equilibrium inverse demand, (11), and highlights that existing machines will
be used more intensively in the socially-planned allocation. This is a natural consequence of the monopoly
distortions and can also be interpreted as the socially-planned allocation involving a subsidy of 1￿￿ in the use
of machines, so that their price should be identical to the marginal cost, i.e., (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) =￿ =   ￿ ￿
2.
19where ISt<S is equal to 1 if St < S and to 0 otherwise. This implies that the shadow values of
environmental quality at time t is equal to the marginal utility that it generates in this period
plus the shadow value of (1 + ￿) units of environmental quality at time t + 1 (as one unit of
environmental quality at time t generates 1+￿ units at time t+1). This equation also implies
that if for all ￿ > T, S￿ = S, then !t = 0 for all t > T.24


































These equations imply that compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium, the social planner intro-
duces a wedge of !t+1￿=￿t between the marginal product of the dirty input in the production
and its price. This wedge !t+1￿=￿t is equal to the environmental cost of an additional unit of
the dirty input (evaluated in terms of units of the ￿nal good at time t; recall that one unit of
dirty production at time t destroys ￿ units of environmental quality at time t + 1). Naturally,





on the use of dirty input by the ￿nal good producer. This tax rate will be higher when the
shadow value of environmental quality is greater, when the marginal utility of consumption
today is lower, and when the price of dirty input is lower.
Finally, the social planner must correct for the knowledge externality. Let ￿jt denote
the Lagrange multiplier for equation (15) for j = c;d. Naturally, this variable would then
correspond to the shadow value of average productivity in sector j at time t. The relevant















Intuitively, the shadow value of a unit increase in average productivity in sector j 2 fc;dg is




(the number of units of productivity created out of it at time t + 1). This last
term captures the intertemporal knowledge externality.
At the optimum, scientists will be allocated towards the sector with the higher social gain
from innovation, as measured by ￿￿j￿jtAjt￿1. Using (29), we then have that the social planner








=@S > 0, then we would
have !t 6= 0 even when St = S, and the optimal carbon tax may remain positive asymptotically.
20will allocate scientists to the clean sector whenever the ratio















is greater than 1. This contrasts with the decentralized outcome where scientists are allocated







This discussion implies that optimal environmental policy can be implemented using a simple
tax/subsidy scheme, as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 The social planner can implement the social optimum through a tax on the
use of the dirty input (a ￿carbon￿ tax), a subsidy to clean innovation, and a subsidy for the
use of all machines (all proceeds from taxes/subsidies being redistributed/￿nanced lump-sum).
Proof. The main idea of the proof is in the text. The formal proof is provided in the
Supplementary Appendix.
That we need both a ￿carbon￿tax and a subsidy to clean research to implement the social
optimum (in addition to the subsidy to remove the monopoly distortions) is intuitive: the
subsidy deals with future environmental externalities by directing innovation towards the clean
sector, whereas the carbon tax deals more directly with the current environmental externality
by reducing current production of the dirty input, which causes this externality in the ￿rst
place. By reducing production in the dirty sector, the carbon tax also discourages innovation
in that sector. However, using only the carbon tax to deal with both current environmental
externalities and future (knowledge-based) externalities would necessitate a very high carbon
tax, potentially distorting current production and reducing current consumption excessively.
Thus an important implication of this result is that, without additional restrictions on policy,
it would not be optimal to rely only on a carbon tax to deal with global warming; one should
also use additional instruments (R&D subsidies or pro￿t tax on the dirty sector) that direct
innovation towards clean technologies, so that in the future production can be increased using
alternative technologies.
3.2 The structure of optimal environmental regulation
In subsection 2.3, we showed that a temporary pro￿t tax could prevent a disaster when the two
inputs are substitutes. Here we show that, when the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable
and the discount rate is su¢ ciently low, the optimal policy characterized in Proposition 4
25The knowledge externality in our model is extreme because researchers (scientists) capture pro￿ts from
innovation for only one period. Nevertheless, a similar externality exists more generally in endogenous and
directed technical change models, where researchers do not fully capture the social value of innovation because
of both monopoly distortions and knowledge spillovers on future innovations (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002).
21also only involves temporary interventions (except for the standard subsidy that corrects for
monopoly distortions).
More formally, recall that the optimal carbon tax schedule is given by ￿t = !t+1￿=￿tb pdt;
where !t+1, the shadow value of one unit of environmental quality at time t + 1, is equal to


























This expression shows that once St reaches the upper bound S, the optimal tax on dirty




=@S = 0. This, in turn, has implications on how
the dynamics of the optimal tax schedule depend upon the degree of substitutability between
the clean and the dirty inputs.
Proposition 5 If " > 1 and the discount rate ￿ is su¢ ciently small, then in ￿nite time
innovation ends up occurring only in the clean sector, the economy grows at rate ￿￿c and the
optimal subsidy on pro￿ts in the clean sector, qt, is temporary. Moreover, the optimal carbon
tax, ￿t, is temporary if " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) but not if 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿). Finally, if " < 1, the
optimal carbon tax and the clean research subsidy are both permanent, and the long-run growth
rate is zero.
Proof. See Appendix C.
To obtain an intuition for this proposition, ￿rst note that an optimal policy requires avoid-
ing a disaster, since a disaster leads to u(C;0) = ￿1. This in turn implies that the production
of dirty input must always remain below a ￿xed upper bound. But when the discount rate
is su¢ ciently low, it is optimal to have positive long-run growth which, when " > 1, can be
achieved by relying increasingly more on clean input production over time. Not allocating
all research to clean innovation in ￿nite time, would slow down the increase in clean input
production, and thus reduce intertemporal welfare. An appropriately-chosen subsidy to clean
pro￿ts then ensures that innovation occurs only in the clean sector, and when Ac exceeds Ad
by a su¢ cient amount, innovation in the clean sector will have become su¢ ciently pro￿table
that it will continue even after the subsidy is removed (and hence there is no longer a need for
the subsidy). When the two inputs are strong substitutes (" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), production of dirty
input decreases to 0 over time, and as a result, the environmental stock St reaches S in ￿nite
time due to positive regeneration. This in turn ensures that the optimal carbon tax will reach
22zero in ￿nite time. Since dirty input production converges to zero, the economy will generate
a long-run growth rate equal to the growth rate of Ac, namely ￿￿c.
In the complementarity case, the long-run growth rate of ￿nal output is the minimum of the
long-run growth rates of the two inputs, so it is not possible to achieve positive long-run growth
while avoiding a disaster. Nevertheless, avoiding an environmental disaster is still necessary,
so optimal environmental regulation will stop long-run growth.
Remark 4 It is straightforward to compare the structure of optimal policy in this model to
the variant without directed technical change discussed in Remark 3. Since the allocation of
scientists in that case is insensitive to policy, redirecting innovation towards the clean sector is
not possible. Consequently, optimal environmental regulation must prevent an environmental
disaster by imposing an ever-increasing sequence of carbon taxes. This comparison highlights
that the optimistic conclusion that optimal environmental regulation can be achieved using
temporary taxes/subsidies, and with little cost in terms of long-run distortions and growth, is
due to the presence of directed technical change.
4 Calibration
Propositions 4 and 5 provided insights into the qualitative features of optimal environmental
policy. The next step is a careful quantitative analysis to investigate how the endogenous
response of the direction of technical change a⁄ects the costs and bene￿ts of di⁄erent envi-
ronmental policies. Such a quantitative analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper,
because it requires an estimation of the parameters of the innovation possibilities frontier and
the exact degree of substitution between clean and dirty inputs. Instead, we take a ￿rst step
in this direction by investigating the e⁄ects of di⁄erent values of discount rates and elastici-
ties of substitution on the form of open environmental regulation and the resulting timing of
a switch (of R&D and production) to clean technology. We choose parameters to make our
simple calibration exercise as similar to existing quantitative analyses as possible in order to
highlight the new e⁄ects resulting from directed technical change.
We take a period in our model to correspond to 5 years. We set ￿c = ￿d = 0:02 (per
annum) and ￿ = 1 so that the long-run annual growth rate is equal to 2% (which matches
Nordhaus￿ s assumptions in his 2007 DICE calibration). We take ￿ = 1=3 (so that the share of
national income spent on machines is approximately equal to the share of capital). We then
compute Act￿1 and Adt￿1 to match the implied values of Yct￿1 and Ydt￿1 to the production
of nonfossil and fossil fuel production in the world primary energy supply from 2002 to 2006
(according to the Energy Information Administration data). Note that in all our exercises,
when " varies, Act￿1 and Adt￿1 also need to be adjusted (in particular, a higher " leads to a
higher value of the ratio Act￿1=Adt￿1).
23Estimating the elasticity of substitution that would be appropriate for this exercise is
beyond the scope of our simple calibration exercise here. We simply note that since fossil
and nonfossil fuels should be close substitutes (at the very least, once nonfossil fuels can be
transported e¢ ciently), reasonable values of " should be quite high. Throughout the following
calibration exercise, we consider three di⁄erent values for ": a baseline intermediate value of
" = 5, a high value of " = 10, and a low value " = 3 (all three values, together with our
choice of ￿ = 1=3; imply strong substitutability between the two inputs). This range of values
will give us a sense of which of the conclusions depend on the exact value of the elasticity of
substitution.
4.1 Relating environmental quality to carbon concentration
To relate the environmental quality variable S to the atmospheric concentration of carbon,
we use a common approximation to the relationship between the increase in temperature
since preindustrial times (in degrees Celsius), ￿, and the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide (in ppm), CCO2:
￿ ’ 3log2 (CCO2=280):
This equation implies that a doubling of atmospheric concentration in CO2 (since pre-industrial
times, when the concentration was equal to 280 ppm) leads to a 3￿C increase in current tem-
perature (see, e.g., the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, FARIPCC). We then express S as a decreasing function of ￿ and thus of CCO2, so that
S = 0 corresponds to a level of temperature change ￿ approximating ￿disaster temperature￿
￿disaster (described below). More speci￿cally, we set
S = 280 ￿ 2￿disaster=3 ￿ maxfCCO2;280g:
For the quantitative exercise here, we relax the assumption that S0 = S and set the initial
environmental quality S0 to correspond to the current atmospheric concentration of 379 ppm
(S, in turn, corresponds to CCO2 = 280 ppm, the pre-industrial value).
We then estimate parameter ￿ from the observed value of Yd and the annual emission of
CO2 (￿Yd in our model) from 2002 to 2006 according to the Energy Information Administra-
tion. Finally, we choose ￿ such that only half of the amount of emitted carbon contributes
to increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (the rest being o⁄set by ￿environmental
regeneration,￿see again FARIPCC).
4.2 Parametrizing the utility function
Nordhaus￿ and much of the literature following his work￿ assumes that environmental qual-
ity a⁄ects aggregate productivity. We ￿nd it more reasonable that high temperature levels
24and high concentrations of carbon dioxide a⁄ect utility as well as production, and we for-
mulated our model under the assumption that environmental quality directly a⁄ects utility.
Nevertheless, to highlight the similarities and the di⁄erences between our model and existing
quantitative models with exogenous technology, we choose the parameters such that the wel-
fare consequences of changes in temperature (for the range of changes observed so far) are the






with ￿ = 2, which matches Nordhaus￿ s choice of intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In
addition, this utility function contains the term ￿(S) to capture the costs from the degradation
of environmental quality. We choose this function as
￿(S) = ’(￿(S)) ￿
(￿disaster ￿ ￿(S))
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1




for ￿(S) 2 [0;￿disaster], where ’ is a strictly decreasing and concave function, with ’(0) = 1,
’(￿disaster) = 0, ’0 (0) = 0 and lim
￿!￿disaster
’0(￿) = ￿1. This functional form ensures that
our assumptions on the utility function, (2) and (3), are satis￿ed. Note that (33) de￿nes a
￿ exible family of continuous functions parameterized by ￿. As ￿ ! 1, this function converges
to ’1(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿=￿disaster)(1 ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿=￿disaster)) for all ￿ 2 [0;￿disaster) (from L￿Hopi-
tal￿ s rule) and ’1(￿disaster) = 0, and as ￿ ! 1, it converges (pointwise) to the ￿step function￿
’0(￿) = 1 for all ￿ 2 [0;￿disaster) and ’0(￿) = 0 for ￿ = ￿disaster. For our baseline cal-
ibration we choose ￿disaster = 9:2￿C, which is twice the highest estimate of the temperature
increase that would eventually lead to the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (FARIPCC).
In Nordhaus￿DICE model output is a⁄ected by temperature through a multiplicative term
￿(￿) =
￿
1 + 0:0028388￿2￿￿1 in the aggregate production function. We compute the para-
meter ￿ so as to match our function ’ with ￿ over the range of temperature increases up to
3.5￿C.26 This leads to a value of ￿ = 0:3501 in (33), and with this choice of ’ function, our
model generates e⁄ects that are very close to those obtained in Nordhaus￿ s calibration exercises
for increases in temperature less than 3.5￿C. In most of our calibrations, the temperature in-
creases remain within this range of values under the optimal environmental regulation, though
the implications of temperature increases outside this range in￿ uence the structure of optimal
policy.27 Figure 1 compares Nordhaus￿ s ￿ function with our ’ function.
26More precisely, we minimize the L
2-norm of the di⁄erence ￿ ￿ ’ on the interval [0;3:5]:
27Here, we note that in Nordhaus￿ s quantitative exercises, the damage from temperature increases beyond
3.5
￿C still remains quite modest. We do not ￿nd this feature, which is based on out-of-sample extrapolation,
plausible, and in our speci￿cation, where environmental quality directly a⁄ects utility, the cost of increases
above 3.5
￿, particularly those close to 9.2
￿, are substantial. It seems more plausible to us that increases in
temperature close to 9.2
￿C would have disastrous consequences for utility (as well as production).
25Figure 1: The impact of the environmental stock in our calibration and in Nordhaus￿ s DICE
model.
4.3 Results
The debate between Stern and Nordhaus highlighted the importance of the discount rate when
determining the optimal environmental policy. Here we consider three di⁄erent values for the
discount rate: the Stern discount rate of 0:0:01 per annum (which we write as ￿ = 0:001), an
intermediate value of 0:01 per annum (￿ = 0:01), and the Nordhaus￿ s discount rate of 0:015
per annum (￿ = 0:015, which, as in Nordhaus, corresponds to an annual long-run interest rate
of about r = ￿ + ￿g = 5:5%).
We start in Figure 2 by looking at the e⁄ects of di⁄erent values of the elasticity of substitu-
tion for the baseline discount rate value of ￿ = 0:01. The di⁄erent panels show the magnitude
of the subsidy to the clean sector, the allocation of scientists to clean technologies, the ￿carbon￿
tax, the share of clean inputs in total production, and the increase in temperature. Di⁄erent
curves correspond to di⁄erent values of ".
Figure 2B shows that for " = 5 and " = 10, optimal policy involves an immediate switch of
all research to clean technologies. Remarkably, this can be achieved with subsidies to the clean
sector that come to an end very rapidly (Figure 2A). Moreover, carbon taxes are very low in
both of these cases (Figure 2C). This is because subsidies are su¢ cient to redirect technical
change to the clean sector before temperature increases signi￿cantly; thus creating intertempo-
ral distortions to induce large contemporaneous reductions in emissions is unnecessary.28 The
share of clean inputs in total input production increases steadily in both cases, though with
28If there were restrictions on research subsidies or if such subsidies created other distortions, then the role
of carbon taxes would be greater.
26Figure 2: Optimal environmental policy for di⁄erent values of " and ￿ = 0:01
" = 5, it does not exceed 90% until year 60 (Figure 2D, and see also Table 1). Also noteworthy
is the fact that because the share of clean inputs increases only slowly, temperature continues to
increase after the implementation of the optimal policy. For example, with " = 5, temperature
increases for another 55 years (see Table 1), though it does not come close to the ￿disaster￿
levels. The pattern is di⁄erent with " = 3. In this case, the switch to clean technologies is
delayed, and thus dirty technologies continue to improve during the ￿rst 45 years (Table 1). To
compensate for this, however, the carbon tax is much higher than in the other two cases, and
it continues to increase during almost the entire 300 years for which we show the results of the
simulations. Temperature also increases for almost 300 years. The reason for this pattern is
that with " = 3, productive e¢ ciency requires the use of both clean and dirty inputs, and thus
optimal policy delays intervention and the output costs of intervention until later. However,
we believe that relatively high values for the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty
inputs are much more plausible, and thus view the patterns with " = 5 and " = 10 as more
representative.
Table 1 shows some of the key features that emerge from Figure 2, in particular, the ￿rst
year in which more than 50% of research is allocated to clean technologies, both the ￿rst year
in which the output of the clean sector exceeds that of the dirty sector and the ￿rst in which
it becomes 10 times as large as that of the dirty sector, the maximum temperature the earth
reaches, the year in which this maximum temperature is reached, and the ￿rst year in which
27the temperature is back to the baseline of ￿ = 0. Columns 2, 5 and 8 of this table refer to
Figure 2. They show, for example, that with " = 10, under optimal environmental regulation
research immediately switches to clean inputs, the production of clean inputs exceeds the
production of dirty input in year 10, and becomes the majority of input production by year 30.
Maximum temperature is only 1.76￿C above the baseline and temperatures start decreasing
from year 20 onwards. In contrast, with " = 5, the expansion of clean technologies is slower,
and temperature increases for 55 years and reaches a level of 2.38￿C above the baseline. The
table also highlights the di⁄erent results that emerge with a smaller elasticity of " = 3.
Table 1: Optimal policy for di⁄erent values of " and ￿
Elasticity of substitution " 10 5 3
Discount rate ￿ 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001 0.01 0.015
￿ 50% clean research (1st year) 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 45 55
￿ 50% clean inputs (1st year) 10 10 10 25 25 115 40 115 125
￿ 90% clean inputs (1st year) 30 30 30 60 60 155 100 170 180
max ￿ (in ￿C) 1:75 1:76 1:76 2:33 2:38 8:20 3:27 7:96 8:56
year when ￿ is maximal 20 20 20 50 55 195 115 260 285
1st year when ￿ = 0 115 115 115 195 115 > 395 200 > 395 > 395
Figure 3 shows the implications of di⁄erent discount rates focusing on the high value of the
elasticity of substitution, " = 10. The structure of optimal policy and the resulting allocations,
including the path of temperature, are very similar for di⁄erent values of the discount rate.
The only di⁄erence is that the carbon tax is somewhat lower with higher discount rates, since
sacri￿cing current output for future environmental quality is less attractive. Nevertheless,
with all three values of the discount rate, the carbon tax always remains small and declines
rapidly over time. These results are also shown in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 1. Overall,
when the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs is su¢ ciently high so that
directed technical change e⁄ects are pronounced, whether one uses the Nordhaus, the Stern
or an intermediate discount rate has little bearing on the structure of optimal environmental
regulation.
The value of the discount rate matters more when the elasticity of substitution is lower.
Figure 4 and Table 1 show that with the Stern discount rate of ￿ = 0:001, an immediate switch
to clean technologies is optimal even with " = 3, though with other discount rates, the switch
is delayed. Figures 2 and 4 show that a delayed switch in research is compensated by higher
carbon taxes.
28Figure 3: Optimal environmental policy for " = 10 and various values of ￿.
Figure 4: Optimal environmental policy for " = 3 and various values of ￿.
29Corollary 1 above related the costs of delayed intervention to the number of additional
periods of slow growth that this delay would induce. Table 2 instead shows the welfare costs
of delaying implementation of the optimal policy, that is, maintaining the clean innovation
subsidy and the carbon tax at zero for a while before implementing the optimal policy, may be
more informative.29 Welfare costs are measured as the equivalent percentage reduction in per
period consumption relative to the allocation with immediate intervention (we assume that
when intervention starts, it takes the optimal form). The numbers in the table correspond
to di⁄erent values of the elasticity of substitution " (with the initial value Act￿1 and Adt￿1
being changed accordingly), the discount rate ￿ and amounts of delay. The table shows that
delay costs can be substantial. For example, with " = 10 and ￿ = 0:01, a delay of 10 years
is equivalent to 5.99% decline in consumption. The cost of delay increases with the duration
of the delay and the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs,30 and decreases with
the discount rate (since the bene￿t from delaying intervention, which is greater consumption
early on, increases with the discount rate). Note that the variations in the delay cost are
of the same order of magnitude when one varies " or ￿; this suggests that the elasticity of
substitution between clean and dirty input is as important a consideration as the discount rate
when assessing the costs of delaying intervention.
Table 2: Welfare costs of delayed intervention as a function of the elasticity of
substitution and the discount rate
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to immediate intervention)
Elasticity of substitution " 10 5 3
Discount rate ￿ 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001 0.01 0.015
delay = 10 years 9:00 5:99 2:31 5:64 0:63 0:05 3:10 0:05 0:04
delay = 20 years 14:62 8:31 2:36 9:49 0:71 0:11 5:51 0:13 0:11
delay = 30 years 18:55 8:88 2:43 12:5 0:82 0:21 7:81 0:26 0:21
Finally, we brie￿ y discuss the welfare costs of relying solely on a carbon (input) tax in-
stead of combining it with the subsidy to clean research (the optimal environmental policy
derived in Proposition 5). Relying only on this single instrument necessitates very high tax
levels, which distort and reduce production. Consequently, Table 3 shows that there can be
signi￿cant welfare losses relative to the case in which the full optimal environmental regulation
is implemented. The welfare loss tends to be smaller when the elasticity of substitution is
high because in this case a relatively small carbon tax is su¢ cient to redirect R&D to clean
technologies, but the pattern is non-monotone because changes in this elasticity also a⁄ect the
29To isolate the cost of delay, we maintain the optimal subsidy on machines, which corrects for the standard
monopoly distortions, during the period of delay.
30The intuition for this result is that when the two inputs are close substitutes, further advances in dirty
technologies that occur before the optimal policy is implemented do not contribute much to aggregate ouput
once clean technologies have become su¢ ciently more advanced than dirty technologies.
30optimal date of switching to clean innovation. The welfare loss also tends to increase with the
discount rate, as a higher discount rate increases the weight on earlier dates where a signi￿-
cantly higher carbon tax is imposed under the suboptimal policy (but for the same reasons,
the pattern is again non-monotone).
Table 3: Welfare costs of relying solely on carbon tax as a function of the
elasticity of substitution and the discount rate
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to the optimal policy)
Elasticity of substitution " 10 5 3
Discount rate ￿ 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.001 0.01 0.015
Welfare cost 0:92 1:33 1:55 1:38 2:10 4:35 1:57 3:49 2:84
5 Directed technical change with exhaustible resources
Polluting activities often make use of exhaustible resources such as oil or coal. In this section
we analyze a variant of our basic model where dirty input production uses an exhaustible
resource. Exhaustibility of polluting resources may help prevent an environmental disaster
because it increases the cost of using the dirty input even without policy intervention. In
particular, we will show that the presence of an exhaustible resource can prevent a disaster in
the laissez-faire equilibrium when the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable.
More formally, we amend our basic model by assuming that the dirty input is now produced












where Rt is the ￿ ow consumption of the exhaustible resource at time t, and ￿1 + ￿2 = ￿ (so
the labor share in the production of intermediary input remains 1 ￿ ￿). The basic model is
then simply a subcase of this extended model with ￿2 = 0. We assume that the exhaustible
resource can be directly extracted at a cost c(Qt) in terms of units of ￿nal good, where Qt
denotes the resource stock at date t, and c is a decreasing function of Q. This speci￿cation
also makes the exhaustible resource subject to the ￿tragedy of the commons￿ : the price of
the exhaustible resource does not re￿ ect its scarcity value. This assumption is adopted to
simplify the exposition. When we characterize optimal environmental regulation below, this
scarcity value will feature in the social planner￿ s optimization problem. Given the amount of
extraction, the evolution of the exhaustible resource is given by the di⁄erence equation:
Qt+1 = Qt ￿ Rt (35)
In the ￿rst subsection we analyze the laissez-faire equilibrium of this augmented model, and
in the second subsection we derive the socially optimal environmental regulation and compare
its structure to environmental regulation without exhaustible resources.
315.1 The laissez-faire equilibrium
The structure of equilibrium remains mostly unchanged, particularly the equilibrium demands
for the two types of inputs, and the production of clean inputs. The equilibrium demands for












Pro￿ts of monopolists and expected pro￿ts from research in the dirty sector are also modi￿ed
accordingly.
The relative pro￿tabilities of innovation in the clean or in the dirty sector re￿ ect the same
three e⁄ects as before: the direct productivity e⁄ect, the price e⁄ect and the market size e⁄ect
identi￿ed above. The only change relative to the baseline model is that the resource stock now
a⁄ects the magnitude of the price and market size e⁄ects. In particular, as the resource stock
declines, the e⁄ective productivity of the dirty input also declines and its price increases. We































(where ’1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ")) so that the share of labor allocated to the dirty sector decreases
with the extraction cost only when the two inputs are substitutes. Using these expressions, we
obtain the ratio of expected pro￿ts from research in the two sectors, which will determine the































The main di⁄erence from the pro￿t ratio in the baseline model is the term c(Qt)￿2("￿1)
in the right hand side of (38). This new term, together with the assumption that c(Qt) is
decreasing in Qt; implies the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 6 As the resource stock gets depleted over time, innovation incentives in the
clean sector increase when the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1) but decrease when the two
inputs are complements (" < 1).
32Intuitively, resource depletion increases the relative price of the dirty input, and thus re-
duces the market for the dirty input. In the substitutability case this encourages innovation in
the clean sector. In fact, in the laissez-faire equilibrium, innovation will ultimately occur in the
clean sector only (either because the extraction cost increases su¢ ciently rapidly, inducing all
innovation to be directed at clean machines, or because the resource stock gets fully depleted
in ￿nite time). In this case, the dirty input is not essential to ￿nal production and therefore,
provided that initial environmental quality is su¢ ciently high, an environmental disaster can
be avoided while the economy achieves positive long-run growth at the rate ￿￿c. In contrast,
in the complementarity case the increase in the relative price of the dirty input encourages in-
novation in the dirty sector. In addition, in this case the dirty input remains essential for ￿nal
production. Thus positive growth requires an ever increasing rate of extraction, which in turn
leads to the exhaustion of the natural resource in ￿nite time. This in turn prevents positive
long-run growth. This discussion establishes the following proposition (see the Supplementary
Appendix for a proof).
Proposition 7 1. When the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1), innovation in the long-run
will be directed towards the clean sector only and the economy will grow at rate ￿￿c.
Provided that S is su¢ ciently high, an environmental disaster is avoided under laissez-
faire.
2. When the two inputs are complements (" < 1), economic growth is not sustainable in the
long-run.
The most important result in this proposition is that when an exhaustible resource is
necessary for production of the dirty input, the market generates incentives for research to be
directed towards the clean sector, and these market-generated incentives may be su¢ cient for
the prevention of environmental disaster. This contrasts with the result that an environmental
disaster was unavoidable under laissez-faire without the exhaustible resource. Therefore, in
practice to the extent that the increasing price of oil and the higher costs of oil extraction
will create a natural move away from dirty inputs (and other activities creating environmental
degradation), the implications of growth are not as damaging to the environment as our baseline
model suggests. Nevertheless, because of the environmental and the knowledge externalities,
even though an environmental disaster can be averted, the equilibrium is still Pareto suboptimal
(even if it avoids an environmental disaster); the next subsection discusses the structure of
optimal environmental regulation with an exhaustible resource.
5.2 Optimal environmental regulation with exhaustible resources
We now brie￿ y discuss the structure of optimal policy with exhaustible resource. The social
planner again maximizes (1), now subject to subject to the constraints: (4), (7), (8), (9), (15),
33(34) (which replaces (5)), the resource constraint Qt ￿ 0,
Ct = Yt ￿   (Xct + Xdt) ￿ c(Qt)Rt; (39)
and the law of motion of the resource stock given by (35):
As in Section 3, the social planner will correct for the monopoly distortion by subsidizing
the use of machines and will again introduce a wedge between the shadow price of the dirty
input and its marginal product in the production of the ￿nal good, equivalent to a tax ￿t =
!t+1￿=(￿tpdt) on dirty input production. In addition, as noted above, we have assumed that the
private cost of extraction is c(Q) and does not incorporate the scarcity value of the exhaustible
resource. The social planner will naturally recognize this scarcity value and will use a ￿resource
tax￿to create a wedge between the cost of extraction and the social value of the exhaustible
resource. We can establish:
Proposition 8 The social planner can implement the social optimum through a ￿carbon￿tax
(i.e., a tax on the use of the dirty input), a subsidy to clean research, a subsidy on the use of
all machines and a resource tax (all proceeds from taxes/subsidies being redistributed/￿nanced
lump-sum). The resource tax must be maintained forever.
Proof. See the Supplementary Appendix.
In the Supplementary Appendix, we also report a calibration exercise for the model with
exhaustible resources. This exercise shows that the presence of an exhaustible resource does
not change the structure of the optimal policy. As in the baseline case, higher discount rates or
smaller elasticities of substitution push towards delaying the switch to clean innovation. The
presence of an exhaustible resource appears not to have an unambiguous e⁄ect on the date of the
switch to clean innovation (for instance, when ￿ = 0:015, switch occurs immediately for " = 5
whereas it did not without the exhaustible resource; in contrast, when ￿ = 0:015 and " = 3,
the switch occurs 15 years later in the exhaustible resource case than in the non-exhaustible
resource case). With exhaustible resources, the capability of the economy to grow using the
dirty input diminishes as the resource is depleted and its price increases; counteracting this,
the increase in the price of the resource already lowers the production of the dirty input and
slows down environmental degradation. Finally, the calibration exercise in this case also shows
that the increasing price of the resource implies that lower subsidies are su¢ cient to induce
a switch to clean technologies, and for a given switching time to clean innovation, production
switches faster towards the clean sector, since dirty inputs are still becoming more expensive
because of resource depletion; as a consequence, there is less need for a high carbon tax in this
case.
346 Global environmental externalities and policy coordination
We now study a two-country extension of the baseline model in order to investigate the implica-
tions of environmental and knowledge externalities on the need for global policy coordination.
We ask whether environmental regulation in one set of countries (the more advanced North)
can be su¢ cient to avoid environmental disasters and how this conclusion is a⁄ected by the
presence or absence of international trade.
The world economy consists of two ￿countries,￿North and South, and we index all variables
(except the quality of the environment, which is common to all countries) with a superscript
k 2 fN;Sg. We think of the North as the technological leader and of the South as representing
countries behind the world technology frontier, bene￿ting from technological spillovers from
the North.
The environmental quality S enters the utility of households in both countries in the same
way as in (1). Most importantly, environmental externalities are global, thus the law of motion
of the quality of the environment is a function of the total dirty input production in the two
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The North is identical to the economy described in the baseline model of Section 2. To
simplify the discussion, we assume that the South has exactly the same production structure
(the same technology for ￿nal production, (4), the same technology for the production of dirty
and clean inputs, (5), and the same marginal cost of producing machines,   ￿ ￿2 units of the
￿nal good), and also has s = 1 scientists, but Southern scientists work only on imitating already
developed technologies in the North (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991). This assumption
captures the intuitive notion that the South is technologically less advanced and adopts the
innovations developed in the North (perhaps with some delay).31
Southern scientists direct their (imitation) research towards dirty or clean machines in the
same way that Northern scientists did. In particular, once they choose a particular sector, as
with the Northern scientists, they are randomly allocated to a single machine in the sector of
their choice, and in sector j 2 fc;dg they have a probability ￿j 2 (0;1) of successfully imitating
this machine (again without congestion, so there is at most one scientist per machine). If they
are successful, they will have imitated the frontier machine in the North, thus for machine i
in sector j 2 fc;dg, they will have access to the machine of quality AN
jit. Moreover, they will
be given a one-period monopoly right over this successfully imitated machine (for use in the
31Naturally, we could allow scientists in the South to also choose whether to work towards original innovations
or to imitate Northern technologies. We do not introduce this choice to simplify the exposition and focus on
the e⁄ects of Northern technological advances on technology adoption decisions in the South, which is a crucial
global interaction that has not been highlighted by previous analyses.
35South only). For a machine type for which there has not been a successful innovation, monopoly
rights are allocated to a Southern entrepreneur drawn at random, and this entrepreneur will
use the technology from the previous period AS
jit￿1. Therefore, the structure of technological
advances in the South is very similar to that in the North, with the only di⁄erence being that
￿success￿brings a machine of quality equal to the frontier quality in the North rather than an
incremental improvement over the current machine quality in the South.
Given these assumptions, when sS
jt scientists in the South undertake research in sector












This equation, together with the law of motion of productivity in the North, (15), gives the
evolution of productivity levels in the two sectors in the North and the South.
In the remainder of this section, we investigate this global economy without trade in inputs,
and then turn to the implications of international trade for the environment and the need for
global policy coordination.
6.1 Preventing environmental disaster without global policy coordination








t is a carbon tax at time t and qN
t is the subsidy on clean pro￿ts
(both of those applied only in the North). There is no global policy coordination, so that these
policies do not apply to producers in the South. Instead, to capture the relevant situation
in which environmental regulations are more lax in developing countries, we assume that the
Southern ￿rms operate under laissez-faire.
Since in the South all machines are also supplied by monopolists, the static equilibrium
in both the South and the North, given technology levels, is the same as that given by our
analysis in subsection 2.2. In addition, as with the researchers in the North, the decision of
Southern scientists to direct their (imitation) activity towards dirty or clean inputs will be
determined by the relative pro￿tability of having access to monopoly rights (for one period) in
the two sectors. The expected pro￿ts from these monopoly rights in the South are denoted by
￿S
jt for sector j 2 fc;dg at time t and are given by an equation very similar to (16), adapted
only to the di⁄erent innovation possibilities frontier facing Southern scientists:
￿S






The crucial di⁄erence here from (16) is that successful imitation will lead to the imitation
of the currently available technology in the North, which explains the term AN
jt at the end.
Consequently, the pro￿tability of imitating clean relative to dirty technologies in the South is
































If this ratio is greater than 1, then imitation will be directed to the clean sector only; and if
it is smaller than one, imitation will be directed towards the dirty sector only (￿nally, if it is
equal to 1 imitation can occur in both sectors simultaneously).32
Equation (42) shows that the relative pro￿tability of imitation of di⁄erent types of machines
is shaped by the same market size and price e⁄ects that determined innovation in the North.
However, there is also a di⁄erent type of knowledge externality, re￿ ected by the term (AN
ct=AN
dt)
on the right hand side of (42), now resulting from the innovation decisions in the North.
Intuitively, pro￿ts from imitation are proportional to the target productivity level, which here
is the technology in the North, and thus, this knowledge externality favors imitation in the
sector that is relatively more advanced in the North. In particular if the quality of clean
machines becomes much higher than the quality of dirty machines in the North, this will create
an incentive for the South to imitate in the clean sector. This last observation is important
for understanding why, under certain circumstances, environmental disaster can be avoided
without global policy coordination.
A key implication of (42) is that if " > 1 and the North devotes all its research e⁄ort to
innovation on clean machines, ￿rms in the South will also switch to clean imitation activities
in the long run, and AS
ct will grow at the same rate as AN
ct, i.e., at rate ￿￿c.33 In particular,
suppose that indeed the North undertakes an environmental policy that redirects all innovation
towards the clean sector, but there is no global policy coordination, so that the South remains
under laissez-faire. The equilibrium production of dirty inputs in the South is then given by




















































33To see this, note that: (i) A
S
ct cannot grow faster than A
N
ct since the South cannot do better than imitating
the North; (ii) in the long run, A
S
ct will in fact grow at the same rate as A
N
ct; to obtain a contradiction suppose
it grew more slowly; then (42), together with the fact that A
N
dt and therefore A
S
dt remain bounded as the North




dt goes to in￿nity as t ! 1; but then imitation in














dt must exceed 1, and consequently, in ￿nite time all
imitation in the South will switch to the clean sector.
37This expression highlights that in the long run, output of the dirty input in the South will






￿’+￿, which does not grow if ’ + ￿ ￿ 0 (that is if
" ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), and otherwise grows at rate (1 + ￿￿c)
’+￿ ￿ 1.
Given this observation, the main insights here parallel those in subsection 2.3. In particu-
lar, as in subsection 2.3, when " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿), the global production of dirty input will grow to
in￿nity (since production over the dirty input in the South grows steadily over time). Conse-
quently, an environmental disaster is unavoidable. In contrast, when " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿), i.e. when
the two inputs are strong substitutes, environmental disaster can be avoided if S is su¢ ciently
large. As all innovation in the North is directed to clean inputs, in this case, the production of
dirty inputs in the North stops growing. The analysis in this subsection shows that Southern
scientists will ultimately imitate clean technologies in the North. Moreover, equation (43) then
implies that the production of dirty inputs in the South will also stop growing. Thus with a
su¢ ciently high level of initial environmental quality, a global environmental disaster can be
prevented even without global policy coordination. The role of directed technical change in
this result is clear, since it is directed technical change that allows the North to redirect inno-
vation towards clean technologies, and it is also the ability of Southern scientists to redirect
their imitation activity towards clean technologies that enables Southern ￿rms to switch to
clean frontier technologies once these have become su¢ ciently advanced.
We summarize this result in the next proposition (proof omitted):







that would direct innovation towards clean technologies only, is su¢ cient to avoid a disaster
without taxation in the South provided that S is su¢ ciently high. If 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿), then
such a policy cannot prevent a disaster.
Proposition 9 shows that a global environmental disaster can be avoided without global
policy coordination. Clearly, optimal environmental regulation will be more complex in this
case and will involve global policy coordination. We characterize the structure of optimal
environmental regulation in the Supplementary Appendix (from the point of view of a global
social planner interested in maximizing the sum of the utilities of households in both countries
given by (1)). The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 10 The global social optimum can be implemented through the combination of
research subsidies, carbon taxes both in the North and in the South, and a subsidy to machine
consumers (against the standard monopoly distortion). If " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), then all optimal
environmental regulation (taxes) are temporary.
386.2 International trade and pollution havens
The argument that knowledge spillovers should induce the South to follow the North in its
switch to clean technologies may be counteracted by international trade, which would create
a greater need for global policy coordination in environmental policies. In particular, free
international trade between the North and the South, combined with environmental regulation
in the North, creates a comparative advantage in dirty input production in the South. Loosely
speaking, in this case, the South may become a ￿pollution haven￿ . This in turn may make an
environmental disaster more likely, as we illustrate below.
In the presence of international trade in inputs between the North and the South, our
model has a Ricardian structure, and the country with the higher relative productivity in
dirty inputs, given technology and policies, will specialize in the production of these inputs.
To highlight the main issues, let us focus on the case where " > 1. As in subsection 6.1, we







towards the clean technologies (here, as before, ￿N
t is a tax on the production of the dirty input
in the North, and qN
t is subsidy on pro￿ts in the clean sector in the North); (ii) that the South
remains under pure laissez-faire. Free trade in inputs implies that the post-tax price for each
input (j = c;d) must be equalized in the North and the South, so that:
pN
ct = pS





















and the country with a higher ratio in (45) will have a comparative advantage in the clean
sector; the other country will have a comparative advantage in the dirty sector. This implies















This expression encapsulates the ￿pollution haven hypothesis￿ . It implies that a higher
carbon tax rate ￿N
t and a higher relative quality of clean machines in the North create a
comparative advantage for the South in dirty input production. In this case, environmental
policy in the North alone, without global policy coordination, may be insu¢ cient to avoid an
environmental disaster because it may indirectly increase dirty production by inducing these
activities to move to the South. A full analysis of this case is beyond the scope of the current
paper. The Supplementary Appendix provides a simple example where a policy that avoids
environmental disaster under autarky fails to do so under free trade (without global policy
coordination or environmental regulations in the South).
397 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced endogenous directed technical change in a growth model with envi-
ronmental constraints and limited resources. We characterized the structure of equilibria and
the dynamic tax/subsidy policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal
welfare. Both the long-run properties of the equilibrium and optimal policies (or the necessary
policies to avoid environmental disaster) are related to the degree of substitutability between
clean and dirty inputs, to whether dirty input production uses exhaustible resources, and to
initial environmental and resource stocks.
The main implications of factoring in the importance of directed technical change are as
follows: (i) when the inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can
be achieved using temporary policy intervention (e.g., a temporary research subsidy to the
clean sector), and need not involve long-run distortions; (ii) optimal policy involves both
￿carbon taxes￿and research subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon taxes can be avoided;
(iii) delay in intervention is costly: the sooner and the stronger is the policy response, the
shorter is the slow growth transition phase; (iv) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty
input production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two inputs
are substitutes. Thus the response of technology to policy leads to a more optimistic scenario
than that emerges from models of with exogenous technology; in particular, environmental
problems can be solved with only temporary intervention and without causing major long-run
distortions. However, directed technical change also calls for immediate and decisive action in
contrast to the implications of several exogenous technology models used in previous economic
analyses.
A simple quantitative evaluation suggests that, provided that elasticity of substitution
between clean and dirty inputs is su¢ ciently high, optimal environmental regulation should
involve an immediate switch of R&D resources to clean technology, followed by essentially
all production switching to clean inputs. This conclusion appears robust to the range of
discount rates used in the Stern report and in Nordhaus￿ s work (which lead to very di⁄erent
policy conclusions in models with exogenous technology). Interestingly, in most cases, optimal
environmental regulation involves small carbon taxes because research subsidies are able to
redirect innovation to clean technologies before there is more extensive environmental damage.
Our paper is a ￿rst step towards a comprehensive framework that can be used for theoretical
and quantitative analysis of environmental regulation with endogenous technology. Several
directions of future research appear fruitful. First, it would be useful to develop a more detailed
multi-country model with endogenous technology and environmental constraints, which can be
used to discuss issues of global policy coordination and the degree to which international trade
should be linked to environmental policies. Second, an interesting direction is to incorporate
￿environmental risk￿ into this framework, for example, because of the ex ante uncertainty
40on the regeneration rate, ￿, or on future costs of environmental damage. Another line of
important future research would be to exploit macroeconomic and microeconomic (￿rm- and
industry-level) data to estimate the relevant elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty
inputs.
Appendix A: Equilibrium allocations of scientists
In this Appendix, we characterize the equilibrium allocation(s) of innovation e⁄ort across the


























where s = sc = 1 ￿ sd 2 [0;1]. Clearly, if f(1) > 1, then s = 1 is an equilibrium; if f(0) < 1,
then s = 0 is an equilibrium; and ￿nally if f(s) = 1 for some s 2 (0;1), then s is an equilibrium.
Given these observations, we have:
1. If 1 + ’ > 0 (or equivalently " < (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)), then f(s) is strictly decreasing in
s: Then it immediately follows that: (i) if f(1) > 1, then s = 1 is the unique equilibrium (we
only have a corner solution in that case); (ii) if f(0) < 1, then s = 0 is the unique equilibrium
(again a corner solution); (iii) if f(0) > 1 > f(1), then by continuity there exists a unique
s 2 (0;1) such that f(s) = 1, which is the unique (interior) equilibrium.
2. If 1+’ < 0 (or equivalently " > (2￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)), then f(s) is strictly increasing in s: In
that case: (i) if 1 < f(0) < f(1); then s = 1 is the unique equilibrium; (ii) if f(0) < f(1) < 1;
then s = 0 is the unique equilibrium; (iii) if f(0) < 1 < f(1); then there are three equilibria,
an interior one s = s￿ 2 (0;1) where s￿ is such that f(s￿) = 1, s = 0 and s = 1.
3. If 1+’ = 0; then f(s) ￿ f is a constant. If f is greater than 1, then s = 1 is the unique
equilibrium; if it is less than one, then s = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
This characterizes the allocation of scientists and implies the results in Lemma 1. ￿
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
We consider the cases where the two inputs are gross substitutes (" > 1) and complements
(" < 1) separately.
Case " > 1: Assumption 1 together with the characterization of equilibrium allocation of
scientists in Appendix A implies that initially innovation will occurs in the dirty sector only
41(sdt = 1 and sct = 0). From (15), this widens the gap between clean and dirty technologies and
ensures that sdt+1 = 1 and sct+1 = 0, and so on in subsequent periods. This shows that under
Assumption 1, the equilibrium is uniquely de￿ned under laissez-faire and involves sdt = 1 and
sct = 0 for all t.
Case " < 1: In this case the result follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When " < 1, long-run equilibrium innovation will be in both sectors so that the
equilibrium share of scientists in the clean sector converges to sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d).
Proof. Suppose that at time t innovation occurred in both sectors so that ￿ct=￿dt = 1.












Innovation will therefore occur in both sectors at time t+1 whenever the equilibrium allocation










This equation de￿nes sct+1(= 1 ￿ sdt+1) as a function of sct(= 1 ￿ sdt). We next claim that
this equation has an interior solution sct+1 2 (0;1) when sct2 (0;1) (i.e., when sct+1 is itself
interior). First, note that when ’ > 0 (that is, " < 1), the function z(x) = x1=(’+1) ￿ x is
strictly decreasing for x < 1 and strictly increasing for x > 1. Therefore, x = 1 is the unique






1 + ￿￿d(1 ￿ sct)
;
is a one-to-one mapping from (0;1) onto ((1 + ￿￿d)
￿1 ;1 + ￿￿c). Finally, it can be veri￿ed
that whenever X 2 ((1 + ￿￿d)
￿1 ;1 + ￿￿c), we also have X1=(’+1)2 ((1 + ￿￿d)
￿1 ;1 + ￿￿c).
This, together with (47), implies that if sct 2 (0;1), then sct+1 = X￿1(X(sct)1=(’+1)) 2 (0;1),
proving the claim at the beginning of this paragraph.
From Appendix A, when ’ > 0; the equilibrium allocation of scientists is unique at each
t. Thus as t ! 1, this allocation must converge to the unique ￿xed point of the function







This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now given the characterization of the equilibrium allocations of scientists in Appendix
A, under Assumption 1 the equilibrium involves sdt = 0 and sct = 1, i.e., innovation occurs
42initially in the clean sector only. From (15), Act=Adt will grow at a rate ￿￿c, and in ￿nite time,
it will exceed the threshold (1 + ￿￿c)
￿(’+1)=’ (￿c=￿d)
1=’. Lemma 2 implies that when this










equilibrium innovation occurs in both sectors, i.e., sdt > 0 and sct > 0, and from this point
onwards, innovation will occur in both sectors and the share of scientists devoted to the clean
sector converges to ￿d=(￿d + ￿c). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ￿
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
Using (27), the shadow values of clean and dirty inputs satisfy
b p1￿"
ct + (b pdt (1 + ￿t))
1￿" = 1: (48)











































































so that the production of dirty input is decreasing in ￿t. Moreover, clearly as ￿t ! 1, we have
Ydt ! 0.
We next characterize the behavior of this tax rate and the research subsidy, qt, in the three
cases separately covered in the proposition. Recall that to avoid an environmental disaster, the
optimal policy must always ensure that Ydt remained bounded, in particular, Ydt ￿ (1 + ￿)S=￿.
Substitutability case: Assume " > 1. The proof consists of six parts: (1) We show that,
for a discount rate ￿ su¢ ciently low, the optimal allocation cannot feature a bounded Yct thus
Yct must become unbounded as t goes to in￿nity; (2) We show that this implies that Act must
tend towards in￿nity (3) We show that if the optimal allocation involves Yct unbounded (i.e
limsupYct = 1) then it must be the case that at the optimum Yct ! 1 as t goes to in￿nity;
(5) We prove that the economy switches towards clean research, that is, sct ! 1, (6) we prove
that the switch in research to clean technologies occurs in ￿nite time, that is, there exists ~ T
such that sct = 1 for all t ￿ ~ T. (6) We then derive the implied behavior of ￿t and qt.
43Part 1: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that the optimal allocation features Yct re-
maining bounded as t goes to in￿nity. If Ydt was unbounded then there would be an envi-
ronmental disaster, but then the allocation cannot be optimal in view of the assumption that
limS#0 u(C;S) = ￿1 (equation (2)). Thus Ydt must also remain bounded as t goes to in￿nity.
But if both Yct and Ydt remain bounded, so will Yt and Ct. We use the superscript ns (ns for
￿no switch￿ ) to denote the variables under this allocation.
Consider an alternative (feasible) allocation, featuring all research being directed to clean
technologies after some date ^ t, i.e., sct = 1 for all t > ^ t and no production of dirty input (by
taking an in￿nite carbon tax ￿t). This in turn implies that St reaches S in ￿nite time because
of regeneration at the rate ￿ in (9). Moreover, (21) implies that Yt=Act ! constant and thus
Ct=Act ! constant. Let us use superscript a to denote all variables under this alternative
allocation. Then there exists a consumption level C < 1, and a date T < 1 such that for
t ￿ T, Cns
t < C, Ca
t >C + ￿ (where ￿ > 0) and Sa
t = S. Now using the fact that u is strictly
increasing in C and S, for all t ￿ T we have
u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns










which is positive and strictly increasing over time. Then the welfare di⁄erence between the
alternative and the no-switch allocations can be written as
















































Since the utility function is continuous in C, and Cns
t is ￿nite for all t < T (for all ￿), then as ￿
decreases the ￿rst term remains bounded above by a constant, while the second term tends to
in￿nity. This establishes that Wa ￿ Wns > 0 for ￿ su¢ ciently small, yielding a contradiction
and establishing that we must have Yct unbounded when t goes to in￿nity.
Part 2: Now (21) directly implies that
















where M is an upper-bound on Ydt. g is an increasing function and limsupYct = 1, so
limsupAct = 1 and as Act is weakly increasing, limAct = 1.
Part 3: Now suppose by contradiction that liminf Yct 6= 1, then by de￿nition if must be the
case that 9M0 such that 8T, 9t > T with Yct < M0. Let us consider such an M0 and note that we
can always choose it to be higher than the upper bound on Ydt. Then we can de￿ne a sequence
t(n) with t(n) ￿ n and Yct(n) < M0 for all n: Since Ydt < M0 as well, we have, for all n: Ct(n) <
44Yt(n) < 2"=("￿1)M0. But we also know that Act converges towards in￿nity with t; thus there ex-
ists a integer ￿ such that for any t > ￿, Act > (￿= )
￿￿=(1￿￿) 2"=("￿1)M0=(1 ￿ ￿). Consequently,
for n ￿ ￿ we have: Ct(n) < Yt(n) < 2"=("￿1)M0 and Act(n) > (￿= )
￿￿=(1￿￿) 2"=("￿1)M0=(1 ￿ ￿).
Consider now the alternative policy that mimics the initial policy, except that in all pe-
riods t(n) for n ￿ ￿ the social planner chooses the carbon tax ￿a
t(n) to be su¢ ciently large
(the superscript a designates ￿alternative￿ ) that Y a
dt(n) = 0: Then we have: Y a
t(n) = Y a
ct(n) =
(￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) Act(n); which yields Sa
t ￿ St for all t ￿ t(n) since the alternative policy either
reduces or maintains dirty input production relative to the original policy. Moreover, we have:
Ca
t(n) = (1 ￿ ￿)Y a
t(n) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) Act(n) > 2"=("￿1)M0 > Ct(n); whereas consumption
in periods t 6= t(n) remains unchanged. Thus the alternative policy leads to (weakly) higher
consumption and environmental quality in all periods, and to strictly higher consumption in
periods t = t(n); thus overall to strictly higher welfare, than the original policy. Hence the
original policy is not optimal, using a contradiction. This in turn establishes that on the
optimal path liminf Yct = 1 and therefore limYct = 1:
Part 4: From Part 3 we know that on the optimal path Yct=Ydt ! 1, that is (1 + ￿t)
1￿" (Act=Adt)
’ !






























Since (1 + ￿t)(Act=Adt)











Now by contradiction let us suppose that liminf sct = s < 1:Then for any ~ T there exists ￿ >
~ T, such that sc￿ < (1+s)=2. Now, as lim(Ct=Act) = (￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) (1 ￿ ￿), there exists some T
such that for any t > T, we have Ct < (￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) (1 ￿ ￿)Act (1 + ￿￿c)=(1 + ￿￿c (1 + s)=2):
Then take ￿ su￿iciently large that ￿ > T and sc￿ < (1 + s)=2; and consider the following
alternative policy: the alternative policy is identical to the original policy up to time ￿￿1, then
at ￿, the alternative policy allocates all research to the clean sector, and for t > ￿, the allocation
of research is identical to the original policy, and for t ￿ ￿, the carbon tax is in￿nite. Then
under the alternative policy, there is no pollution for t ￿ ￿ so the quality of the environment is
weakly better than under the original policy. Moreover: Aa
ct = (1 + ￿￿c)Act=(1 + ￿￿csc￿), for































45so that the alternative policy brings higher welfare. This in turn contradicts the optimality of






































































Now, suppose that sct does not reach 1 in ￿nite time. Then for any T, there exists ￿ > T,
such that sc￿ < 1. For T arbitrarily large sc￿ becomes arbitrarily close to 1, so that 1 ￿ sc￿
becomes in￿nitesimal and is accordingly denoted ds: We then consider the following thought
experiment: let us increase the allocation of researchers to clean innovation at ￿ from sc￿ < 1
to 1, but leave this allocation unchanged in all subsequent periods. Meanwhile, let us adjust
the tax ￿t in all periods after ￿ in order to leave Ydt unchanged. Then using superscript a to












d(ln(Adt)) = ￿￿￿dds + o(ds):
Using the fact that that d(ln(Act)) and d(ln(Adt)) are of the same order as ds, ￿rst-order
Taylor expansions of (53) and (54) give:
d(ln(Ct)) (56)





















































ctd(ln(Act)) + (1 + ￿t)
" A
’









+o(ds) + o(d(ln(1 + ￿t)));
46and




















ctd(ln(Act)) + (1 + ￿t)
" A
’
dt (’d(ln(Adt)) + "d(ln(1 + ￿t)))
A
’




+ o(ds) + o(d(ln(1 + ￿t))):
Then, using the fact that in the variation in question taxes are adjusted to keep production
























































+ o(ds) + o(d(ln(1 + ￿t))):

























is bounded and bounded away from 0; (iii) the terms in front of d(ln(Adt)) and d(ln(Act))
are bounded. Therefore, we can rewrite (56) as:














d(ln(Adt)) ￿ d(ln(Act)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)























































dt (1 + ￿t)




































will be smaller than ￿￿c=(1 + ￿￿c),
and thus consumption increases. This implies that the alternative policy raises consumption
for all periods after ￿, and does so without a⁄ecting the quality of the environment, hence the
original policy cannot be optimal. This contradiction establishes that sct reaches 1 in ￿nite
time.
47Part 6: Thus the optimal allocation must involve sct = 1 for all t ￿ ~ T (for some ~ T < 1)
and Act=Adt ! 1. Then, note that (64) implies that even if ￿t = qt = 0, the equilibrium
allocation of scientists involves sct = 1 for all t ￿ T for some T su¢ ciently large. This is
su¢ cient to establish that qt = 0 for all t ￿ T is consistent with an optimal allocation. Finally,
equation (51) implies that when " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), Ydt ! 0, which together with (9), implies that




=@S = 0 combined with
(28) and (26) implies that the optimal input tax reaches 0 in ￿nite time. On the contrary,
when " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿), even when all research ends up being directed towards clean technologies,
(21) shows that without imposing a positive input tax we have Ydt ! 1 and therefore St = 0
in ￿nite time which cannot be optimal. So in this case, taxation must be permanent at the
optimum.
Complementarity case: If " < 1, from (21), the growth rate of the economy is the
minimum of the growth rates of Ydt and Yct. Positive asymptotic growth then implies that
Ydt ! 1 and St ! 0, which cannot be optimal. Thus optimal allocations involve zero long-run
growth. Moreover, the carbon tax must also be positive in the long run, since the environmental
externality remains ￿rst order as t ! 1. This completes the proof of Proposition 5. ￿
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50Supplementary Appendix
Speed of disaster in laissez-faire






















When the two inputs are gross substitutes (" < 1), we have ’ = ’su < 0; whereas when
they are complements (" > 1), we have ’ = ’co > 0 . Since all innovations occur in the dirty
sector in the substitutability case, but not in the complementarity case, if we start with the







kt denote the average productivities in sector k at time t respectively in the









































































+1 > Y co
dt:
Repeating the same argument for t + 1, t + 2,..., we have that Y su
dt > Y co
dt for all t. This
establishes that, under Assumption 1, there will be a greater amount of dirty input production
for each t when " > 1 than when " < 1, implying that an environmental disaster will occur
sooner when the two sectors are gross substitutes.
Equilibrium pro￿t ratio with exhaustible resources
We ￿rst analyze how the static equilibrium changes when we introduce the limited resource
constraint. Thus here we drop subscript t for notational simplicity. The description of clean
sectors remains exactly as before. Pro￿t maximization by producers of machines in the dirty
sector now leads to the equilibrium price pdi =
 
￿1 (as ￿1 is the share of machines in the




















di di = c(Q)
















which in turn, together with (34), leads to the following expression for the equilibrium pro-
















The equilibrium pro￿ts from producing machine i in the dirty sector becomes:


















The production of the clean input and the pro￿ts of the producer of machine i in the clean









and pro￿ts from producing machines ci are












Next, labor market clearing requires that the marginal product of labor be equalized
across sectors; this, together with (59) and (60), leads to the equilibrium price ratio (36): thus
a higher extraction cost will bid up the price of the dirty input. Pro￿t maximization by ￿nal
good producer still yields (10) which, combined with (36), (59) and (60) yields the equilibrium
labor share (equation (37)). Hence, the higher the extraction cost, the higher the amount of
labor allocated to the clean industry when " > 1, but the opposite holds when " < 1.
The ratio of expected pro￿ts from undertaking innovation at time t in the clean versus the
































































: This establishes (38). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
The analysis in the text implies that the social optimum can be implemented through a combi-
nation of a carbon tax ￿t, a subsidy to clean research qt, and a subsidy to the use of machines.
In particular, ￿t is given by (28), and the subsidy to the use of all machines is chosen to induce
(25). To determine the subsidy qt to clean research, ￿rst note that in the optimal allocation








Then, using (25), (27) and (61), we obtain:
Lct
Ldt
















so that pre-tax pro￿ts are










Therefore, for given research subsidy qt on pro￿ts in sector c; the ratio of expected pro￿ts from
innovation in sectors c and d, the equivalent of (20) becomes
￿ct
￿dt














Clearly, when the optimal allocation involves sct = 1, we (the planner) can choose qt to make
this expression greater than one. Or more explicitly, set











When the optimal value of sct 2 (0;1), then setting qt = ^ qt achieves the desired objective. ￿
53Proof of Proposition 7
First, we derive the equilibrium production of R and Yd.
Using both, the fact that the ￿nal good is chosen as numeraire and the expression for the











































Similarly, using the expression for the equilibrium labor ratio (37), and labor market










































Next, using the above expressions for equilibrium prices and labor allocation, and plugging

































































































In the remaining part of the proof, we again separately consider the case in which the two
inputs are complements and the case where they are substitutes.
54Substitutability case: When " > 1, production of the dirty input is not essential to ￿nal
good production. Thus, even if the stock of exhaustible resource gets fully depleted, it is still
possible to achieve positive long-run growth. For a disaster to occur for any initial value of the
environmental quality, it is necessary that Yd grow at a positive rate while R must converge














must be equal to zero, which is impossible since c(Q) is bounded above. Therefore, for su¢ -
ciently high initial quality of the environment, a disaster will be avoided.
Next, one can show that innovation will always end up occurring in the clean sector only.
This is obvious if the resource gets depleted in ￿nite time, so let us consider the case where it















so that to prevent innovation from occurring asymptotically in the clean sector only it must be
the case that A
￿’
c does not grow faster then A
￿’1











grows at a positive rate over time, so that the resource gets depleted in ￿nite time after all.
Complementarity case: When " < 1, Yd is now essential for production and thus so is
the resource ￿ ow R. Consequently, it is necessary that Q does not get depleted in ￿nite time in










= 1, and positive long-run growth requires positive
growth of both dirty input and clean input productions. This requires that innovation occurs














so that R grows over time. But this in turn leads to the resource stock being fully exhausted
in ￿nite time, thereby also shutting down the production of dirty input, which here prevents
positive long-run growth. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 8
We denote the Lagrange multiplier for the equation (35) by mt. Then, the ￿rst-order condition













55where recall that b pjt = ￿jt=￿t. Here, the wedge mt=￿t is the value, in time t units of ￿nal
good, of one unit of resource at time t.
The shadow value of one unit of natural resource at time t is then determined by the
￿rst-order condition with respect to Qt, which is
mt = mt￿1 + ￿tc0 (Qt)Rt
and thus implies








(where m1 is the limit of mt when t ! 1).












In particular, the optimal resource tax is always positive.
Characterization of global optimal environmental policy with no trade case
We now characterize the optimal policy from the point of view of a global social planner inter-
ested in maximizing the sum of the utilities of households in both countries (both given by (1)).
This social planner will choose a dynamic path of ￿nal good production Y k
t , consumption Ck
t ,
intermediary input productions Y k
jt, machines production xk
jit, labor share allocation Lk
jt, sci-
entists allocation sk
jt and quality of machines Ak
jit for each country k = N;S and environmental



















under the same constraints as for the baseline model, except that equation (9) becomes (40),
and the productivity growth in the South equation (41).
Thus the maximization problem is very similar to that analyzed in subsection 3. One
di⁄erence is that the shadow value of an environmental unit, which is identical in the two












+ (1 + ￿)!t+1:
The social planner will still introduce a wedge !t+1￿=￿k
t between the price of the dirty
input and its marginal product in the production of the ￿nal good. This wedge has the same
56interpretation as in the one country case; and thus it will be the higher (in absolute value) in
the country with the lowest value ￿k
t , that is, the country with the lowest marginal utility of
consumption (the rich country). This wedge translates into an optimal tax on the dirty input











This expression is identical to that in the one-country case, and one can similarly establish
that the optimal carbon tax will be temporary if the clean and dirty inputs are su¢ ciently
close substitutes.
Using the equivalent of (49) and (28) in the two-country model, one can show that the
comparison between the optimal carbon tax in the North and the South, is governed by the
following proposition:
























In particular an increase in the relative productivity in the dirty sector in country k
(Ak
dt=Ak
ct ), a decrease in the marginal value of consumption ￿k
t or an increase in the shadow
value of environment !t+1, either of these increases the tax ￿k
t in country k . The second
e⁄ect will push towards a higher tax in the North, whereas (as long as the dirty sector is more
advanced relative to the clean sector in the South than in the North), the ￿rst e⁄ect will push
for a higher tax in the South. Without further assumptions either of these two e⁄ects may
dominate, and in particular if the South lags far behind with respect to productivity in the
clean sector, the dirty carbon tax may end up being higher in the South.
De￿ne ￿k
jt as the Lagrange multiplier at time t for the growth equation for sector j in

























In words: the shadow value of one more unit of clean productivity is equal to its marginal




- the rate of productivity growth in the North between t and t + 1- (corre-
sponding to the second term), plus an additional term ￿csS
jt times the value of one unit of
clean productivity in the South. This term did not exist in the closed economy, because it
57represents the international knowledge spillover: each additional unit of productivity in sector
j in country N creates ￿csS
jt units of productivity in sector j in country S.34
The optimal allocation of scientists in the South will be governed by the comparison











This analysis, combined with the same reasoning as for Proposition 5, establishes the
following result (proof omitted):
Proposition 12 The social optimum can be implemented through a combination of pro￿ts
and carbon taxes both in the North and in the South, and a subsidy to machine consumers (to
remove the monopoly distortion). If " > 1=(1￿￿) and the discount rate is su¢ ciently low, the
optimal environmental taxes are temporary.
Perfect competition in the absence of innovation
Here we show how our results are slightly modi￿ed if, instead of having monopoly rights
randomly attributed to ￿entrepreneurs￿when innovation does not occur, machines are pro-
duced competitively. There are two types of machines. Those where innovation occurred at






1￿￿ LjAji. Those for which innovation failed are produced competitively. In this case,
machines are priced at marginal cost  , which leads to a demand for competitively produced






1￿￿ LjAji. The number of machines produced under
monopoly, is simply given by ￿jsj (the number of successful innovation).
34The shadow value ￿
S






























The interpretation is basically the same as for ￿
N
jt: the shadow value of a unit of clean productivity is equal
to its marginal product at time t, plus 1 ￿ ￿js
S
jt+1 times its shadow value at time t + 1 (￿js
S
jt+1 machines
will adopt the technology in the North at time t + 1: thus, the decision to allocate scientists to imitation in
clean technologies in the South, is more "short sighted", that is with a higher weight on current pro￿ts, than if
the North did not exist and the South had to innovate without bene￿ting from knowledge spillovers from the
North). Here, there is no technological spillover from South to North, hence the absence of a third term on the
RHS of this equation (unlike in the previous equation for ￿
N
jt).














































is the average corrected productivity level in sector j (taking into account that some machines
are produced by monopolists and others are not).































































This yields the modi￿ed lemma:
































































This modi￿ed lemma can then be used to prove the analogs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 in the
text. The results with exhaustible resource can similarly be generalized to this case.
59Calibration for the exhaustible resource case
We perform a similar calibration exercise as in the subsection 4; as before, a time period
corresponds to dt = 5 years, ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1=3. and Yc0 and Yd0 are still identi￿ed with the
world production of energy from non-fossil and from fossil fuel origins respectively between 2002
and 2006. The de￿nitions of S, ￿, and ￿, and the utility function u(C;S) are also unchanged
from the baseline calibration. Now to map our extended model with only one exhaustible
resource to reality where we ￿nd at least 3 exhaustible resources (oil, natural gas and coal), we
assume that each of the resource is used in constant proportion over time and we focus on oil
use. More speci￿cally, we compute the share of world energy produced from crude oil in the
total amount of energy produced from fossil fuels from 2002 to 2006 (still according to the EIA).
We then convert units of crude oil production and stock into units of total fossil production
and stock by dividing the former by the share of world energy produced with oil relative to
the world energy produced by any fossil fuel. We take the price for the exhaustible resource
to be measured by the re￿ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil in the US (measured in
2000 chained dollars), all these data are taken from the EIA. We detrend the price series from
1970 to 2007 and restrict attention to the period 1997 to 2007 (during which the ￿ltered real
price of oil increases). We then parametrize this price as a quadratic function of the estimated
reserves of fossil resource. The estimated price of the fossil resource in 2002, combined with
the consumption of fossil resource between 2002 and 2006, together with the value of world
GDP from 2002 to 2006 from the World Bank,35 and the initial values of Yc0 and Yd0; then
allow us to compute ￿2, Ac0 and Ad0 and the cost function c(Q) as the price of the exhaustible
resource in units of the ￿nal good. Finally ￿c is still taken to be 2% per year, but ￿d needs
to be rescaled. Indeed, if innovation occurs in the dirty sector only, output in the long-run




of Ad, so we compute ￿d such that innovation in the dirty sector still corresponds to the same
long-run annual growth rate of 2% after making this correction.
We now show how the optimal policy with exhaustible resource compares with that in the
baseline case for three con￿gurations of (";￿): the case (" = 3 and ￿ = 0:015) is one where
the social planner is most inclined to adopt a more gradual approach, the case (" = 10 and
￿ = 0:001) is one where the social planner is most inclined to act promptly, and (" = 5 and
￿ = 0:01) corresponds to a medium case.
As illustrated by Figure 5B, the switch towards clean innovation occurs immediately when
we calibrate the model with exhaustible resource as in the baseline case for (" = 10;￿ = 0:0:01)
and (" = 5;￿ = 0:01), however the switch to clean innovation occurs slightly later in the ex-
haustible resource case when (" = 3;￿ = 0:015) : as already stressed above, the reason is that
while the growth prospects in the dirty sector are hampered by the depletion of the resource
35The dollar value of world GDP typically allows us to convert 2000$ into our price normalization
60Figure 5: Optimal environmental policy with and without exhaustible resource for
(" = 10;￿ = 0:001), (" = 5;￿ = 0:01) and (" = 3;￿ = 0:015).
61(this pushes towards an earlier switch to clean innovation), on the other hand, less dirty input
is being produced in the exhaustible resource case, which in turn can accommodate a later
switch to clean innovation. Which e⁄ect dominates depend upon the parameters: for example,
when (" = 5;￿ = 0:015); switch to clean innovation occurs immediately with the exhaustible
resource whereas it occurred after year 60 or so without. However, the clean research subsidy
does not need to be as high as in the baseline case to induce the switch: the resource tax and
the cost of extraction also do their part of the job, and this is shown in Figure 5A. Figure 5C
shows that the dirty carbon tax does not need to be as high as in the baseline case (for the
same reason), whereas the switch to clean production occurs earlier than in the baseline case
as shown by Figure 5D￿ except when (" = 3;￿ = 0:015) where the later switch in innovation
goes along with a slightly later switch to clean production. Figure 5E shows that when " is
lower the resource tax needs to be higher, as more of the resource ends up being extracted at
any time (as shown in Figure 5F). Finally, Figure 5G shows that temperature increases less
over time with the exhaustible resource.
Equilibrium disasters under free trade without global policy coordination
In this appendix, we illustrate the possibility that a policy that would avoid a disaster under
autarky may nonetheless lead to an environmental disaster under free trade because it would
induce the South to become a ￿pollution haven￿ . We illustrate this possibility by providing a
numerical example. We identify the North with the world economy of Section 4 where we let





and ￿c = ￿d = 0:1. We assume that the North follows the environmental policy that was
optimal in Section 4 when ￿ = 0:01 (per year), with all research in the North being directed
towards clean innovation and with the carbon tax evolving over time as shown in Figure 2C for
" = 5. We then simulate the dynamics of this world economy both, under free trade and under
autarky. Under free trade, there may be multiple equilibria in the innovation decisions in the
South. For this simulation exercise, we assume that whenever there are multiple equilibria,
Southern researchers will be able to coordinate on the ￿better￿equilibrium, with coordination
on research in clean technologies. This makes an equilibrium disaster under free-trade less
likely. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6A shows that the switch towards clean imitation in the South occurs later under
free trade than under autarky. This will be the main cause of disaster under free trade. Indeed,
we see in Figure 6B that dirty production per se does not increase much when moving from
autarky to free trade (in fact world dirty production decreases only slightly at the beginning),
as long as the imitation pattern is the same under the two regimes. But Figure 6C shows
62Figure 6: 2 countries case: simulation of a policy that avoids a disaster under autarky but not
under free trade
63that as soon as the South has switched to clean imitation under autarky, temperature follows
a very di⁄erent path under the two regimes: it starts declining under autarky, whereas under
free trade it keeps increasing until it reaches the disaster level of 9.2￿C. Intuitively, under free
trade before researchers in the South switch to clean technologies developed in the North,
these technologies need to becomes su¢ ciently more advanced (relative to autarky) so as to
compensate for the pro￿ts that Southern producers can earn by producing in the dirty sector.
This prolongs the duration of the period during which the world is still producing signi￿cant
pollution and makes an environmental disaster more likely.
64